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ADAM, MARTIN AND JOHN:
ICONOGRAPHY, INFRASTRUCURE, AND AMERICA'S
PATHOLOGICAL INCONSISTENCY ABOUT MEDICAL
INSURANCE
Jeffrey W Stempef
INTRODUCTION
Following the ongoing health care and insurance debate, which has
once again moved toward center stage in American politics, one might
* Jeffrey W. Stempel, Doris & Theodore B. Lee Professor of Law, William S. Boyd
School of Law, University of Nevada Las Vegas. © Copyright 2008. Jeffrey W. Stempel.
Special thanks to Symposium authors Mary Anne Bobinski, David Hyman, Tim
Jost, Wendy Mariner, Dayna Bowen Matthew, whose contributions to this Symposium grew
out of their participation in the 2007 AALS Annual Meeting Insurance Law Section
Program, Health Insurance: Crossroads or Gridlock, Jan 7, 2007, Washington, DC. Thanks
also to commentator Amy Monahan and to Seth Chandler, Nan Hunter, Angie Johnson, and
Ann McGinley. Regarding the title of this comment, my apologies of course extend to
Dick Holler and Dion DiMucci, respective author and performer of the 1968 hit song
Abraham, Martin & John memorializing the assassinations of Presidents Abraham Lincoln,
John Kennedy and civil rights activist Martin Luther King as well as to readers too young to
remember either the song or its bygone era of optimism and enthusiasm for government
activity and infrastructure. In perhaps some evidence that the 1960s are not completely
eradicated, DiMucci, who also performed pop hits such as Teenager in Love, Run-Around
Sue and The Wanderer, subsequently overcame a heroin addiction and continues to record to
favorable reviews. See, e.g., Son of Skip James (Verve Forecast Records 2007). See also
Patrick Reardon, Keepsakes of Lincoln, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 10, 2005, p. 1, col. 1 (original sheet
music for Abraham, Martin & John on display at Lincoln presidential library in Springfield,
Illinois); Kevin O'Hare, Singer Dion still romas around-around-around, NEW ORLEANS
TIME-PICAYUNE, July 11, 2004, p. 10.
In this article, I shall use the terms "medical insurance" and "health insurance"
interchangeably. But my preferred term (in contrast that of most everybody else) is medical
insurance. What is popularly and euphemistically labeled health insurance of course does
not assure health. One can be fully covered and experience horrendous health. Similarly,
coverage does not assure that medical care received will be adequate, competent, or
successful (no matter how adequate or competent). More precisely, what we generally label
health insurance is simply insurance that provides coverage for medical care expenses
(however defined and restricted under the terms of a medical insurance policy). As
becomes apparent in this article, I find the nomenclature unfortunate in that it helps to feed
the subconscious misconception that people have some significant control over their own
health. The best we can do is to reasonably maximize sound preventive care and assure that
when adverse health events strike, the victim will be accorded reasonable medical care
without regard to personal wealth.
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understandably get the impression that the most important names in the
area are politicians such as Hillary Clinton, Barack Obama, John Edwards,
John McCain, or Mitt Romney.' Similarly, public intellectuals and pundits
1. All of these persons are, of course, presidential candidates who have each
proposed various solutions for the perceived deficiencies of American health care and
medical insurance. Democrats Clinton, Obama and Edwards have suggested quite similar
plans modeled to some degree upon the mandated private coverage plan adopted by
Massachusetts in 2006. Republicans McCain and Romney, have proposed less regulatory
and government inverventionist models relaying primarily on tax credits and incentives.
See Farhana Hossain, Where The Democrats Stand/Where the Republicans Stand, NEW
YoRK TIMES, Sun., Dec. 30, 2007 at 14-15. See, e.g., John Edwards, Building one America
- through tax-funded health care, LAS VEGAS REVIEW, Jan. 18, 2008, at 9B, col. 1. None of
the major candidates has proposed a single payer plan, in spite of earlier predictions to the
contrary. See, e.g., Fred Bannister, November Is Coming And Single-Payer Proposals
Could Follow, NAT'L UNDERWRITER (Life & Health ed.), June 5, 2006, 27. As discussed
herein, this is largely a reflection of the success with which market-based ideology favoring
private insurers has dominated the public policy debate. See Cynthia Crossen, Before WWI
Began, Universal Health Care Seemed a Sure Thing, WALL ST. J., April 30, 2007, B 1, col. 1
Ironically, Romney as Governor of Massachusetts supported that state's plan,
which is quite similar to the major Democratic intitatives, albeit after opposing some
provisions sought by the legislature, which overroad his veto before he signed the final bill
into law. See Sally C. Pipes, Intensive Care for RomneyCare, WALL ST. J., Feb. 26, 2007,
A19, col. 3 (CEO of conservative policy institute critical of Massachusetts plan identified
with Romney); Steve LeBlanc, Mass. House Overrides Gov. Romney Veto of Health Care
Fee, INS. J., April 26, 2006, available at
www.insurancejournal.com/news/east/2006/04/26/67613.htrm (describing peculiear
circumstances and limited nature of veto as well as Romney's overall support for and
advocacy of the law); Edit., Romney Care, WALL ST. J., April 12, 2006, A14, col. I
(identifying Romney as proponent of plan, which Journal criticized as failing to "measure
up to the political and media hosannas.").
See also, David Leonhardt, A Health Fix That Is Not a Fantasy, N.Y. TIMES, April
12, 2006, at Cl, col. 1 (praising Masschusetts plan as prudent compromise between
Canadian-style system and status quo in U.S.); see also Steve Piontek, 0 Massachusetts,
NAT'L UNDERWRITER (Life & Health ed.), April 10, 2006 at 4;
Although Massachusetts has received the most attention, the past two years have
seen a number of state-based initiatives to address a perceived shortage of sufficient medical
coverage and federal failure to act. See Joanne Wojcik, Drive to force health coverage
gains traction, 18 states consider measures, Bus. INS., May 29, 2006 at 11. See, e.g., Kevin
Sack, San Francisco to Offer Care For Every Uninsured Adult, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2007,
A1, col. 1; Kan. Governor Calls for Universal Health Care, Tax Cuts, INS. J., Jan. 12, 2007,
available at www.insurancejournal.com/news/midwest/2007/01/12/75813.htm; Tom Breen,
W. Va. Seeks Fix for Soaring Health Insurance Costs, INS. J., Jan. 3, 2007, available at
www.insurancejournal.com/news/southeast/2007/01/03/75544.htm; Bredesen: Tennessee
Health Plan 'Opposite' of Massachusetts, CLAIMS GUIDES, April 19, 2006, available at
www.claimsguides.com/news/southeast/2006/04/19/67413.htm. See also Kevin Freking,
Sen. Kennedy Urges Universal Health Plan, Solicits Recommendations, INS. J., Jan. 11,
2007, available at www.insurancejournal.com/news/natioanl/2007/01/11/75809.htm.
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such as David Broder, David Brooks, Paul Krugman (or at least the New
York Times and Wall Street Journal editorial pages) come to mind.2
Alternatively, health care scholars such as the instant Symposium
participants or other health policy scholars such as Uwe Reinhardt, Troyen
Brennan or Theodore Marmor, although not quite household words in most
of the United States, are well known to even the casual traveler in the
region and might be advanced as important figures in the debate.3
But these people, however accomplished, important or wise they may
be, arguably have less to do with the ongoing health insurance status quo in
American than two dead men. The arguably most important people, at
least iconographically, for American Health Care are John Wayne and
Adam Smith.4 More precisely, the characteristics they have come to
See also Leonhardt, supra, at Cl, col. 1 ("To a lot of thoughtful people, the only
way to fix the health insurance crisis is to get the federal government to cover everyone.
Britain, Canada, Japan and a number of other rich countries do so, and they each spend less
many on health care than this country does. They also don't have major companies, like
General Motors, flirting with bankruptcy in large part because of the cost of health benefits.
It is a pretty good argument, but it has an undeniable flaw. There is almost no chance of
universal coverage happening anytime in the foreseeable future. Health insurers made $100
billion in profits last year, and industries of that size are just not legislated out of
business.").
2. Broder, Brooks, and Krugman are all syndicated columnists and authors who
frequently write on public policy and health care issues. See, e.g., David S. Broder, Health-
care hybrid connects with officials, SACRAMENTO BEE, May 1, 2006, available at
www.sacbee.com/content/opinion/story (specifically commentiong on Romney's role in
Massachusetts). Although faceless, the editorial pages of the Times and the Journal, as well
as those of other major American newspapers, arguably are the leading public intellectuals
in the health care debate and politics generally.
3. Reinhardt is a well known economist and health care expert at Princeton. Brennan
teaches at Harvard Medical School and writes frequently on health care issues. Marmor, a
similarly well-known author, is professor of politics, public policy and law at Yale
University. See, e.g., Aaron S. Kesselheim & Troyen A. Brennan, The Swinging Pendulum:
The Supreme Court Reverses Course on ERISA and Managed Care, 5 YALE J. HEALTH
POL'Y & ETHICS 451,451 (2005); Troyen A. Brennan, et al., Identification of Adverse Events
Occurring During Hospitalization, 112 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 221, 221 (1990); Uwe E.
Reinhardt, The Economist's Model of Physician Behavior, J.AM. MED. ASS'N, Vol. 281, No.
5, Feb. 3, 199 at 462; Reinhardt, Reforming the Health Care System: The Universal
Dilemma, 19, AM. J. L. & MED., 21, 21 (1993); Theodore Marmor, Wanting It All: The
Challenge of US Health System Reform, 55 KAN. L. REv. 1137, 1137 (2007); Theodore R.
Marmor, How Not to Think About Medicare Reform, 26 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 107
(2001).
4. Other now-dead men, many of them largely anonymous, have of course also
played a key role because of past decisions that shaped the current health care status quo.
See Timothy Stolzfus Jost, Is Health Insurance a Bad Idea? The Consumer-Driven
Perspective, 14.2 CONN. INS. L.J. 377 (2008) (hereinafter Jost, Bad Idea?) (noting tax
2008]
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embody and personify in the historical and public mind drive much of the
reflexive thinking about American health care and medical insurance -
largely in unfruitful directions. A third long-deceased icon personifies a
different vision, but one that has never taken center stage in the medical
insurance debate.
John Wayne needs little introduction, even to the members of
Generations X & Y. His movies, most of them westerns, continue to
populate cable movie channels. More than thirty years after his death, he
continues to be the paradigmatic representation of the myth of American
rugged individualism and self-sufficiency.5 Under the Wayne model, the
individual is both charged with controlling his own destiny and expected to
succeed in doing so, in spite of long odds, with little or no help from others
(save or a possible gunslinging sidekick or two). This archetype is
expected to engage in effective self-help without hesitation (or
guilt)(what's a few dead bodies in the service of a greater cause?),
complaint, or self-pity. Even things like being shot are only minor setbacks
to this archetype. Certainly, acute or chronic illness would not break his
stride and he would not expect government to provide him any health care
safety net.
Adam Smith, who needs perhaps even less introduction to readers of a
scholarly journal, was the Eighteenth Century Scottish philosopher and
economist who persuasively argued that largely unregulated private
subsidies for particular types of medical insurance); David A. Hyman, Health Insurance:
Market Failure or Government Failure?, 14.2 CONN. INS. L.J. 307 (2008) (hereinafter
Hyman, Government Failure?) (noting role of World War II wage and price controls, 1943
IRS Ruling, and 1954 legislation, and labor union demands encouraging use of employer-
provided medical insurance as fringe benefit that was not taxed when received by workers
but could be deducted by employers as a business expense). Accord, John V. Jacobi,
Consumer-Directed Health Care and the Chronically 111, 38 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 531, 531
(2004) (addressing more recent "path to consumer-driven health care"); David. A. Hyman &
Mark Hall, Two Cheers for Employment-Based Health Insurance, 2 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y
& ETHICs 23, 25-26 (2001) (describing development of employer-provided group insurance
in more detail). As Oliver Wendell Holmes famously observed, a page of history is worth a
volume of logic and outcomes are to a large extent path dependent. See, New York Trust
Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921).
5. Typically, Wayne portrayed a strong, silent type good guy who when pressed
would fight (with quite deadly force) for his rights and those of anyone oppressed by the bad
guys de jour in his movies, who where most often ordinary criminals or business thugs
along with the occasional Indian (Wayne would never have used the words "native
American") renegade (e.g., The Comancheros). In occasional forays outside the Western
movie genre (e.g., The Quiet Man), Wayne largely portrayed the same character, albeit
unarmed and less prone to violence.
[Vol. 14:2
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markets were the key to economic growth and prosperity. According to
Smith, the pursuit of private gain by individuals and entities throughout
society would, as if guided by an "invisible hand," lead to the optimal
allocation of goods and services. This, in turn, would create an optimally
efficient state of affairs and maximum aggregate wealth for society.6
Implicit in Smith's assessment, but underemphasized relative to wealth,
was the inevitability that some market participants would fare better than
others. A tacitly paid price for greater overall wealth and economic growth
was relative poverty and failure for some. During much of post-Smith
history, the "fallout" from his market-oriented approach, which was largely
accepted in Europe and North America, was treated as a necessary evil
required to obtain the benefits of a vibrant mercantile system.
During the Twentieth Century, politics and government moved to
soften the edges of inequality through social welfare programs and
infrastructure designed to foster greater equality of opportunity (e.g., public
schools). In addition, it became recognized that on occasion the invisible
hand faltered and market failure or imperfection justified regulatory
correction.7  Thus, notwithstanding the demi-god status of Smith (to the
intellectual public) and Wayne (to the general public), there is a strong
social justice strand in American thought that emphasized communitarian
norms such as equal access, solidarity against life's greatest threats, and
assistance to the less fortunate. Arguably, no particular person epitomizes
this school of American thought to the degree Wayne embodies rugged
individualism and Smith market efficiency. As this article argues, that's
part of the problem: the iconic status of rugged individualism and market
efficiency is so firmly established in the American psyche that it works to
the occasionally unfortunate detriment of social justice and communitarian
6. See ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (Prometheus Books 1991) (1776).
7. This revision to the pure laissez faire or invisible hand ideology that dominated
the U.S during the late 19th Century is most associated with Franklin Delano Roosevelt's
"New Deal," which established significant regulatory infrastructure for many business
activities. However, the administrations of predecessor Presidents Theodore Roosevelt and
Woodrow Wilson had also made considerable strides in this direction, as had Congress.
After Republican challenges by Wendell Willkie and Thomas Dewey to Franklin Roosevelt
and Harry Truman, respectively failed, many of the basic New Deal principles and
structures were accepted, at least tacitly, by all major political actors, including Dwight
Eisenhower, who succeeded Truman as president. See PAUL KRUGMAN, A LIBERAL
CONSCIENCE Chs. 1-3 (2007); Suzzanne Bilyeu, FDR: how he changed America - and still
affects your life today; no President has had as great an impact on everyday life in America,
N.Y TIMEs UPFRONT, Jan. 14, 2008, p. 24.
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values. American resistance to a government-administered single-payer
system of medical insurance is one of those unfortunate occasions.
Perhaps the closest thing to a Wayne or Smith-like secular icon
embodying social justice and community compassion values is Martin
Luther King, although others might prefer Abraham Lincoln, Franklin
Delano Roosevelt, Robert Kennedy, some other progressive politician,
military leader (George C. Marshall or Dwight Eisenhower would be
credible candidates), or social welfare advocate (e.g., Marian Wright
Edelman) as the symbol of this segment of national thought.8
8. To (I hope) state the already known: Lincoln was President of the United States
during the Civil War; Kennedy was Attorney General of the United States and U.S. Senator
from New York during the 1960s; Army General Marshall was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff during World War II and the driving force behind the Marshall Plan to rebuild
Europe after the War; Army General Eisenhower was Supreme Allied Commander in
Europe during the War and later President: Edelman is founder of the Children's Defense
Fund (and a sufficiently iconic figure that Hillary Clinton took pains to mention her status as
Clinton's first employer after law school during the Democratic candidates' debate in South
Carolina on Jan. 21, 2008). Certainly, the author of Abraham, Martin and John saw Lincoln
and Kennedy as united in common cause with King as well as by their violent death's form
assassin's bullets. See introductory note, supra.
In attempting to identify a personification of social justice and communitarian
values, I am specifically overlooking religious figures. My selection of King as icon for the
social justice school of American thought could be viewed as a religious figure in that King
was a Protestant Minister and frequently invoked religious themes in his speeches. See
Sarah Vowell, Radical love gets a holiday, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2008, A19, col. 1 (noting
King's use of biblical themes and comparison of his speeches, particularly "I Have a
Dream" speech, to Jesus's Sermon on the Mount). See, e.g., Martin Luther King, Jr., Letter
From Birmingham City Jail (April 12, 1963) (making repeated religious references to Jesus
Christ and other religious figures in writing to addressees "as a fellow clergyman and a
Christian brother" hoping to find them "strong in the faith"), reprinted in JAMES M.
WASHINGTON (ED.), A TESTAMENT OF HOPE: THE ESSENTIAL WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF
MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., 289 (1986) and (perhaps more accessible to the legal profession)
STEPHEN N. SUBRIN, MARTHA L. MiNOW, MARK S. BRODIN & THOMAS 0. MAIN, CIVIL
PROCEDURE: DOCTRINE, PRACTICE AND CONTEXT 149 (2d ed. 2004). See also Walker v.
City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967) (reprinting as Appendix King's speech in
connection with efforts to stage protest march) ('We believe in a system of law based on
justice and morality.").
In spite of this, I view King as primarily a socially secular figure. Certainly, he
tried hard to be inclusive and non-denominational even as he invoked religious themes. For
example, his Letter from a Birmingham Jail takes plain to include reference to his "Christian
and Jewish brothers" and he specifically discusses the Jewish philosopher Martin Buber.
More important, King's legacy today is a secular one of racial and social justice
founded on rational concepts of fair treatment of individuals and retains little of its once
more overtly religious air or rhetoric. As testament, I am writing this on the national King
holiday (Monday, Jan. 22, 2008), one widely observed in an overwhelmingly secular
[Vol. 14:2
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In addition, there is a "professionalism" paradigm for conceiving health
care that competes with an economic/market competition model, a social
justice/rights-based model, and an institutional model. 9 Peter Jacobson has
characterized the field as reflecting "an ongoing struggle between market
proponents (a consumer-driven health care system), proponents of a social
justice model (largely governmentally determined), and medical
professionals" with the social justice model in at least temporary ebb while
"the real struggle for doctrinal supremacy in health law is between the
market and professional models."'"
Interestingly and ironically, Adam Smith can perform double duty on
as a representative of the professionalism model as well. Smith supported
professional self-regulation (and substantial remuneration for
manner. In a widely televised CNN Democratic presidential earlier in the day, there was
considerable reference to King, including a concluding Wolf Blitzer question regarding
which candidate King would endorse were he still alive (and not assassinated on April 4,
1967 in Memphis, Tennessee, an event noted in the 1983 U2 song Pride in the Name of
Love), further testament to King's place in secular popular culture). All of the discussion
was secular and did not mention King's religious roots or rhetoric. See also Martin Luther
King, III and John Edwards, email from Edwards for President campaign, Jan. 21, 2008
(Democratic presidential candidate attempts to use favorable comments by King's eldest son
to win votes and contributions in secular manner).
Perhaps the ultimate proof of King's secular status, albeit kitschy and perhaps
offensive to veterans of the civil rights movement, is an email I received on January 21,
2008 announcing a "Martin Luther King Day Special" on continuing legal education
through which an attorney could pay "only $199 to fulfill your California MCLE" as part of
the vender's desire to "celebrate [King's impact on American life." See Martin Luther
King Day Special: Only $199 to Fulfill Your Entire California MCLE, Law.com CLE
Center, Jan. 21, 2008. Just as George Washington and Abraham Lincoln became associated
with winter furniture sales, King's legacy has been appropriated, in at least some part, by
commercial interests. Once again, the Smith/Wayne iconography of market and individual
consumerism exhibits an imperialism that attempts to impose itself on social justice and
professionalism.
9. See Peter D. Jacobson, Health Law 2005: An Agenda, J. L. MED. & ETHICS 725,
734-35 (Winter 2005), quoting LAWRENCE 0. GosTIN & PETER D. JACOBON, LAW AND THE
HEALTH CARE SYSTEM (2005). See also PETER D. JACOBON, STRANGERS IN THE NIGHT: LAW
AND MEDICINE IN THE MANAGED CARE ERA 212 (2002).
10. See Jacobson, supra note 9, at 735. For examples of a social justice perspective
on health care issues, see, e.g., Dayna Bowen Matthew, Assessing Patient Protection Laws,
47 ST. Louis U. L.J. 299, 302 (2003); Dayna Bowen Matthew, The "New Federalism"
Approach to Medicaid: Empirical Evidence that Ceding Inherently Federal Authority to the
States Harms Public Health, 90 KY. L.J. 973, 934 (2002); Dayna Bowen Matthew,
Controlling the Reverse Agency Costs of Employment-Based Health Insurance: Of markets,
Courts, and a Regulatory Quagmire, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1037, 1502 (1996) (also
making economic and behavioral analysis of issues).
2008]
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professionals) in order to achieve high professional standards and quality
that would in turn redound to the benefit of society." In effect, a good part
of the current health care debate can be characterized as one waged by the
ghosts of the Market Smith and the Professionalism Smith.
Regarding the competing paradigms outlined by Jacobson, I am
arguably adding rugged individualism and personal responsibility to the list
rather than treating it solely as a subset of the economic/market model. On
the issue of institutional competence, I accept Jacobson's assessment that
this is an important framing device in debating health policy, one that (as
discussed later in this article) weighs in favor of a greater government role
in providing medical coverage. But institutional competence as a school of
thought is less prominent in the American psyche. No particular icon of
institutional competence emerges in national folklore, although it is
perhaps personified to an extent by FDR, who popularized government as a
competent institution to respond to economic and social concerns and to
provide a safety net and springboard for the citizenry. Perhaps a better
human representation of the institutional aspect of health policy debate
would be Lyndon Johnson, whose political skill and electoral power in the
wake of his 1964 landslide over Barry Goldwater brought about
Medicare.
12
The trio of Smith, Wayne and King, of course, played no direct role in
the development of health care and medical insurance policy. But the
perceptions and attitudes they represent have driven much of American
11. See SMITH, supra note 6, at 111.
We trust our health to the physician; our fortune and sometimes our
life and reputation to the lawyer and attorney. Such confidence could
not safely be reposed in people of a very mean or low condition. Their
reward must be such, therefore, as may give them that rank in the
society which so important a trust requires. The long time and the great
expence which must be laid out in their education, when combined with
this circumstance, necessarily enhance still further the price of their
labour.
Id. (spelling in original).
12. See Sonia M. Suter, The Allure and Peril of Genetics Exceptionalism: Do We
Need Special Genetics Legislation?, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 660, 725 n.297 (2001). Looking
abroad, Otto von Bismarck, who as chancellor of Germany established social welfare
programs in the late 19th Century would be a similarly apt representative, as would the
political "fathers" of the health care systems in other European countries and Canada. See
Lewis D. Solomon & Geoffrey A. Barrow, Privatization of Social Security: A Legal and
Policy Analysis, 5 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 9, 11 (1995).
[Vol. 14:2
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opinion that does directly affect the long-running debate and attitudes
toward the status quo and proposed alternatives. Because of Waynian
rugged individualism, there is resistance to communal insurance programs,
even to the point where the old bogeyman of "socialized medicine" remains
a standard part of the stump speeches of at least Republican presidential
candidates (at least during the primary season when preaching to the
faithful). 3 This strand of the American character has also given much
rhetorical force to terms like "consumer-driven," "ownership society,"
"freedom," and "choice."' 4  Working in tandem with the rugged
individualism ethos of "freedom," Smithian fidelity to private markets
makes even Democrats flinch from advocating a single-payer, government
administered medical insurance system, although this is largely the norm in
13. See Mary Anne Bobinski, The Health Insurance Debate in Canada: Lessons for
the United States?, 14.2 CONN. INS. L.J. 341 (2008) ("The very terms of the debate [in the
U.S.] - 'socialized medicine' and 'government bureaucrats' - reveal more about the
signposts of American political discourse than they do about the reality of the [Canadian]
system they seek to describe") (footnote omitted). Mitt Romney, in particular, has used the
phrase as a criticism of the proposals of Democratic candidates notwithstanding his support
for significant government intervention in the medical care market when he was governor of
Massachusetts. See Broder supra note 2.
14. See Barry R. Furrow, Access to Health Care and Political Ideology: Wouldn't
You Really Have a Pony?, 29 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 405, 412 (2007) ("Americans love
efficiency and consumer choice").
As illustrated in Furrow's article, there is often a substantial tension between the
goals of personal autonomy and the quality and availability of medical coverage. Furrow's
primary target in that piece is Hyman, who provided the pony metaphor of choice-versus-
health safety net in a cartoon published in an issue of the Journal of Health Policy, Politics
and the Law focusing on the FTC's Report on Health Care and Competition for which
Hyman was a primary author. Id. at 414. (characterizing market choice position on health
care, including HSAs as "plausible in the abstract but flawed for too many Americans who
need health care, yet still appealing to those ideologically blinded to the costs of the market
in health care and the human waste generated by ideology ungrounded in complex reality").
In this Symposium, Jost and Mariner are not as directly in focused combat with Hyman (a
role that perhaps falls to me) but they reflect a perspective akin to Furrow's. See also
Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, The Massachusetts Health Plan: Public Insurance for the Poor,
Private Insurance for the Wealthy, Self-Insurance for the Rest, 55 KAN. L. REv. 1091, 1092
(2007) (writing from perspective similar to Jost, Bad Idea?, supra note 4 (manuscript at 2-
3)); David A. Hyman, The Massachusetts Health Plan: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly,
55 KAN. L. REv. 1103 (2007) (writing from perspective similar to Hyman, Government
Failure, supra note 4) (and apparently preferring Clint Eastwood to John Wayne as an icon
of rugged individualism).
2008]
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Canada and the Western European societies most analogous to the U.S., 5
societies that seem to be quite productive and free.
Pushing back, with mixed success, against these social and
psychological forces (that also have great political and financial support
from special interests such as private insurers and drug manufacturers) are
the professionalism strand of Smith and King's social justice perspective.
These push in largely the opposite direction, seeking universal, community-
wide medical coverage and greater government involvement to achieve this
goal. 16
The iconic pull of market and individualism notions and personas is so
strong that it has prevented full progression of health coverage in the U.S.
and today supports a strong counter-revolution in the form of Health
Savings Accounts (HSAs) and other types of allegedly "consumer-driven"
health coverage as part of an "ownership" society. 17 Despite increasing
15. In the field of eight Democratic hopefuls (Clinton, Obama, Edwards, Biden,
Dodd, Richardson, Gravel and Kucinich) prior to the January 2008 Iowa caucuses, only
Kucinich backed a government-administered single payer system. See Molly Ball, Meet the
Candidates: l0th in a Series, LAS VEGAS REv.-J., Jan. 1, 2008, at B 1.
16. As Hyman would undoubtedly note, the professionalism perspective receives
substantial special interest support from doctors and to some extent from other medical
providers. See, e.g., David A. Hyman & Charles Silver, The Poor State of Health Care
Quality in the U.S.: Is Malpractice Liablity Part of the Problem or Part of the Solution?, 90
CORNELL L. REv. 893 (2005). But unlike Hyman (at least as I read his work), I do not see
physicians and other medical providers (hospitals, labs, diagnostic services, equipment
makers) as uniformly in lockstep in their drive (strongly emphasized by Hyman) to extract
more money from the pockets of patients or payers (be they government or private insurers).
The relative interests and preferences of medical providers may well diverge. For example,
hospitals might rationally conclude that they will do better under a private insurance regime
than a government single payer regime of medical insurance. As discussed below (TAN 65-
75, infra), I have a strong suspicion that this is the case given the degree to which private
insurance has not in my view done as much to tamp down hospital charges as it has done to
extract discounts from physicians.
17. See Jost, Bad Idea?, supra note 4 (observing trend but criticizing concept and
current operationalization); Russell B. Cate, Move Over Managed Care - Health Savings
Accounts, Small Businesses, and Low Wage Earners: Cost, Quality, and Access, 4 IND.
HEALTH L. REV. 287, 288 (2007) (praising HSAs and consumer-driven movement
generally); John A. Nyman, Consumer-Driven Health Care: Moral Hazard, the Efficiency
of Income Transfers, and Market Power, 13 CONN. INS. L.J. 1, 17 (2006) (taking a critical
stance);. Amy B. Monahan, The Promise and Peril of Ownership Society Health Care
Policy, 80 TUL. L. REv. 777, 777 (2006) (expressing interest in concept but finding current
practice unlikely to accomplish goals of consumer-driven movement); Edward J. Larson &
Marc Dettmann, The Impact of HSAs on Health Care Reform: Preliminary Results After
One Year, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1087, 1123 (2005) (positing positive but not large
impact of HSAs); Jacobi, supra note 4 (finding consumer-driven initiatives such as Health
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evidence that America would be better off moving toward a single payer
system similar to the Canadian-European models,' 8 political reality
continues to serve up either market-based or hybrid systems that at best
provide only halting progress and at worst resemble a private-public
bureaucracy seemingly designed by Franz Kafka and Rube Goldberg. 19
Savings Accounts apt for relatively inexpensive, predictable, routine medical treatment costs
but not for chronic and catastrophic medical costs); Timothy S. Jost & Mark A. Hall, The
Role of State Regulation in Consumer-Driven Health Care, 31 AM. J.L. & MED. 395, 395
(2005); Wendy K. Mariner, Can Consumer-Choice Plans Satisfy Patients? Problems with
Theory and Practice in Health Insurance Contracts, 69 BROOK. L. REv. 485, 508 (2003)
(expressing concerns regarding efficacy of consumer-driven initiatives for actual
consumers); Comment, Employee Driven Health Care: Health Savings Accounts, More
Harm Than Good, 8 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 219, 236 (2005) (attacking the concept). See
also Mark V. Pauly, Patricia Danzon, Paul Feldstein & John Hoff, A Plan for 'Responsible
National Health Insurance', HEALTH AFFAIRS, 5, 7 (Spring 1991), (early argument in favor
of variant of consumer-driven approach much like mandated private insurance purchases of
Massachusetts plan).
18. Studies consistently show that countries with government-administered national
medical insurance have per capita health care costs of approximately half those in the
United States and that by almost all measure, their populations are at least as healthy as
Americans. See PAUL KRUGMAN, CONSCIENCE OF A LIBERAL 218 (2007) (2004 per capita
health care spending in U.S. is $6,102, as compared to $3,165 in Canada, $3,150 in France,
$3,043 in Germany, $2,508 in Great Britain); Jost, Bad Idea?, supra note 4; Justin Lahart,
Rethinking Health Care and the GDP, WALL ST. J., Jan. 25, 2007, at Cl (U.S. spends 16
percent of its gross domestic product on health care, as compared to much lower proportions
for Germany (10.6 percent of GDP), France (10.5 percent), Canada (9.9 Percent), Italy (8.8
percent), the U.K. (8.4 percent), and Japan (8.0 percent) but "Americans don't seem to be
getting much for the money. In both France and Japan, the average life expectancy is higher
than in the U.S., and the infant mortality rate is lower. This is true in most other
[developed] countries .... "). Accord, Uwe E. Reinhardt, Peter S. Hussey & Gerard F.
Anderson, US. Health Care Spending In An International Context, 23 HEALTH AFFAIRS 10,
11 (2004); Gerard F. Anderson, Uwe E. Reinhardt, Peter S. Hussey & Varduhi Petrosyan,
It's the Prices, Stupid: Why the United States Is So Different From Other Countries, 22
HEALTH AFFAIRS 89 (2003) (contending that "[h]igher health spending but lower use of
health services adds up to much higher prices in the United States than in any other
[Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] OECD [a/k/a/ developed]
country.") But see Bobinski, supra note 13 (manuscript at 7-8). (Canadian expenses
recently rising more rapidly than in the past, reaching $4,548 per capita and 10.3 percent of
GNP in 2006); Patricia M. Danzon, Hidden Overhead Costs: Is Canada's System Really
Less Expensive?, 11 HEALTH AFFAIRS 21,22 (1992). See also Troyen Brennan, Transcribed
Speech of Troyen Brennan, 15 ANNALS HEALTH L. 339, Appendices B, C (2006) (U.S.
health insurance premiums nearly doubled between 1999 and 2005, far outpacing both
medical inflation and overall inflation).
19. The 1993 proposal of the Clinton Administration (dubbed "Hillarycare" by critics)
provides perhaps the best example. Diagramming the plan resembled a Jackson Pollock
painting. But other popular proposals such as the Massachusetts plan and those of the
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This comment addresses the legacy of what I term the Wayne-Smith
(market) mindset and its effect on the modem medical coverage debate,
focusing in particular on several misconceptions, overstatements, and
cognitive errors that have prevented the U.S. from embracing a modem,
government-administered universal medical coverage along the lines of the
Canadian-European model. These concepts too greatly dominate American
views on the issue, obstructing progress toward a Canadian or European
model that would dramatically improve the overall cost and quality of
American medical care. A government-administered single-payer system
more consistent with the Smith (professionalism) and King social justice
models would provide more productive templates for expanding,
improving, and streamlining United States medical care.2°
The legacy of uncritical acceptance of the Wayne-like individualism
and Smithian world of omniscient markets include: the legal fictions that
individuals consistently best know their own interests and can effectively
shop for insurance coverage and medical care;21 the legal friction or tension
leading Democratic presidential candidates also contain considerable complexity. See
SUSAN ESTRICH, THE CASE FOR HILLARY CLINTON 104 (2005).
20. I use the term "single-payer" both literally (I would prefer a program more like
that of France or an expanded version of Medicare) and as a short-hand reference meaning a
national government mandated system of public medical insurance even if in distribution
multiple loci of payment are used. See Jost, supra note 14, at 1091 ("This model is often
characterized as a single-payer model, although universal public coverage does not, of
course, require a single payer. Many of the world's social insurance programs in fact have
multiple payers").
Considering costs and benefits in totality, I operate with the premise that the
quality of care increases if, on the whole, a higher quantum of competent medical service is
provided throughout society. Thus, I would consider a system "better" if it served all people
with B+ level care and eliminated noncoverage and reduced substandard care even if some
persons who formerly received A+ or gold-plated care with shorter waiting times would
have preferred the current system. Taking this broad view, there is almost no question that
the Canadian and Western European systems are "better" than that of the U.S. See
Bobinski, supra note 13, ("In the aggregate, the result is that Canadians fare better than
Americans" and noting that as compared to Canadians, Americans "are one third less likely
to have a regular medical doctors, one fourth more likely to have unmet health care needs,
and more than twice as likely to forego necessary medicines." (quoting Karen E. Lasser, et
al., Access to Care, Health Status, and Health Disparities in the United States and Canada:
Results of a Cross-National Population-Based Survey, 96 AMER. J. PUB. HEALTH 1300, 1303
(2006).
21. See TAN 27-53, infra. I realize I am using a modified version of the term "legal
fiction," which most commonly is used to describe a legal rule that, although demonstrably
untrue as an empirical matter, is treated as true under the law in order to achieve a legal-
social end.
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between individualism and communitarian empathy; 22 undue veneration of
markets, failure to appreciate the current system's adverse pressures on
medical professionals;23 failure to realize the degree to which the evolved
status quo already severely compromises market efficiency and medical
professionalism; 24 and unduly credulous acceptance of the supposed
efficiency of private insurance as a vehicle for fair cost control. 25
In addition, the body politic has paid insufficient attention to the
manner in which private insurers have adversely impacted medical
professionalism and the quality of care while at the same time failing to
provide sufficient cost containment.26 Assessing these aspects of the
current debate leads to rejection of the supposedly consumer-driven
approach and toward support for a national, government-administered
single payer program as the preferred alternative to the private insurance
mandates, markets and tax incentives largely suggested as the means of
reforming the American status quo.
For example, the legal rule that a corporation is a "person" under the law for
purposes of constitutional analysis is factually incorrect. The corporate entity is clearly not
a human being. The law treats it, however,as if it was a human being for purposes of
application of the Due Process Clause and other parts of the law. By contrast, the notion
that people are more rational, energetic, ambitious, intelligent, consistent, and careful than
they really are is a misconception of fact rather than a total rejection of the empirical world.
In the real world, people are negligent more often, lazier, dumber, less rational, and more
inconsistent than is assumed by defenders of the U.S. health care status quo or consumer-
driven alternatives. But rather than labeling this a factual fiction, I term it a legal friction
because it has become relatively hard-wired into much of the law reform and public policy
discussion surrounding medical care and insurance issues and is in tension with empirical
reality that would normally be more determinant of public policy outcomes.
22. See TAN 54-58, infra. This friction or tension is explored in Jost, supra note 4,
and Wendy K. Mariner, Social Solidarity and Personal Responsibility in Health Reform, 14
CONN. INS. L.J. 199 (2008). Jost refers to the divide as one of solidarity-vs-individualism
while Marine speaks larges of a social solidarity-vs-personal responsibility dichotomy.
23. See TAN 84-89, infra.
24. See TAN 90-100, infra.
25. See TAN 59-76, infra.
26. See TAN 59-84, infra.
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I. LEGAL FICTIONS AND LEGAL FRICTIONS
A. THE LEGAL FICTION OF THE CONSISTENTLY-RATIONAL,
EMPOWERED CONSUMER
In reality, of course, the strong American values of rugged
individualism and preference for private markets are often compromised,
so much so that we do not even appreciate the degree to which the
America's secular church of public opinion has engaged in heretical
behavior. For many Americans, there is already a largely government-run
medical care system - the Veteran's Administration system of hospitals
and medical care in that arena that is not much different from the socialized
medical system of Great Britain. Similarly, we notice with some alarm
when insurers and their executives earn high profits even if we are hesitant
to raise taxes, stop potentially anticompetitive consolidation or take
regulatory action that might impinge on the profitability of health insurers
or health care providers. Most prominently, through programs like
Medicare and Medicaid (and the Federal Employees Insurance Program),
the government has become deeply involved in medical insurance
notwithstanding purported American fidelity to private markets and
minimalist regulation.
In general, however, the United States has largely resisted Canadian-
European style universal health care and medical insurance out of
deference to the mythology of rugged individualism and efficacy of
markets. In addition, these perceptions have fueled collateral norms and
beliefs that have impeded any move toward a national single payer
approach to health insurance. First, there is what I regard as the erroneous
legal fiction that people are more discerning about their health care and
insurance choices than is actually the case. In addition, we operate under a
legal fiction that to some extent a large percentage of persons afflicted with
medical problems are themselves responsible for their plight through
personal failure. Both of these presumptions, if not completely erroneous,
are at least far more problematic than acknowledged.
First, the issue of whether prospective patients really know what is best
for them regarding medical care and insurance coverage. A large amount
of psychological research suggests that people in general are not nearly as
good at decision-making as is commonly supposed. Rather than being
consistently wise, calculating, rational decisionmakers, people are subject
to a host of cognitive biases that may often warp their assessments. Among
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them are self-serving bias, optimism bias, status quo bias, hindsight bias,
and extremeness aversion.27 In addition, various heuristic traits of humans
govern their decisionmaking process, sometimes in ways that make for sub-
optimal analysis. Among these are the availability heuristic, social
influence, anchoring, and case-based decisions. 28  Further, people
sometimes make irrational decisions because of loss aversion and the
"mental accounting" of excessively compartmentalizing money rather than
viewing it as fungible, which impedes good cost-benefit analysis.29
In general, people are only able to focus on one or two salient factors at
a time when making decisions. They are rational, but only have "bounded"
rationality that is shaped to a large degree by the choices presented, the
manner in which the choices are presented, and the overall context of the
situation requiring a decision.3°  Thus, even under the best of
circumstances, people are often not optimal decisionmakers. They are
often more Britney Spears than John Wayne or Adam Smith.
This becomes particularly problematic regarding medical care and
insurance because these situations seldom present optimal settings for
sound decisionmaking. The process of seeking and evaluating medical care
and advice is often complexity and usually unfamiliar to laypersons. Most
people are not well educated about either medicine or insurance, both of
which are complex. As a result, they will have inherent difficulty making
assessments about competing medical care or insurance alternatives.
As Wendy Mariner has noted, there exist significant differences
between ordinary consumers engaged in regular retail activity and health
care patients. Consumers are active buyers while patients are often
required to be more passive "recipients" of medical services (if they can
afford the services). Consumer spending is more strictly limited by
personal resources while patient expenditures, at least for the insured, are
not strictly tied to patient wealth. Consumers tend to have something
closer to bargaining equality with vendors while patients have "unequal
27. See Cass R. Sunstein, Introduction to BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE AND THE LAW (Cass R.
Sunstein ed. 2000); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Not-So-Peaceful Coexistence: Inherent Tensions
in Addressing Tort Reform, 4 NEV. L.J. 337, 350-51 (summarizing concepts in condensed
fashion).
28. See Sunstein, supra note 27, at 5; Stempel, Coexistence, supra note 27, at 351-52.
29. See Sunstein, supra note 27, at 5; Stempel, Coexistence, supra note 27, at 353.
30. See BARRY SCHWARTZ, THE PARADOX OF CHOICE: WHY MORE is LESS 19-20
(2004); Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and
Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203 (2003); Russell Korobkin, The Efficiency of
Managed Care, "Patient Protection" Laws: Incomplete Contracts, Bounded Rationality,
and Market Failure, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1999).
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skill and knowledge of health care" relative to medical providers.
However, medical providers have at least a quasi-fiduciary duty to the
patient while vendors ordinarily have no fiduciary duty to buyers (but often
do have obligations sounding in statute, regulation or tort law). Most
important, a standard issue consumer makes purchases "based on voluntary
choice" while the medical patient seeks care "based on need."'
' 1
Although they may have tools for mitigating the patients' informational
disadvantage relative to medical care providers and insurers (e.g., WebMD,
word-of-mouth, local reputation),32 these hardly level the playing field for
obtaining medical care. Particularly if a need for medical care arises
suddenly, the consumer is effectively stripped of even the illusion of
choice. In extreme cases (e.g., an auto accident that disables the
consumer), the choice of medical care is made by others. Even when
making conscious choices, the prospective patient is usually limited by
insurance coverage and the treating physician's hospital privileges as well
as the availability of facilities. Once admitted to a hospital for care (which
may take hours if arising unexpectedly, the patient is able to change venue
only if he or she has picked up a few tips from watching Prison Break,
Escape from Alcatraz, or similar media fare.
But the problems of shopping for doctors pale in comparison to the
problems of shopping for insurance. Because many medical events are not
serious, consumers have some chance to gain experience that they can
deploy in obtaining medical care. For example, if the first doctor one sees
is uninformed or unfriendly, the patient can go elsewhere for the next office
visit (although this may be difficult in areas with a shortage of physicians
31. See Wendy K. Mariner, Theory and Practice, supra, note 17, at 495 fig. 1.
32. Tools such as WebMD and a home copy of the Physician's Desk Reference can be
wonderful aides in managing one's own medical care. But self-directed reading and study
alone can of course not even approach the training and expertise of medical professionals.
A consumer can become better informed about medical issues but will never be as
discerning a consumer of medical services as she is of grocery stores, restaurants, or even
more esoteric everyday fare such as auto repair.
Word of mouth and reputation are helpful but suffer a severe limitation in that the
sources of this information usually suffer from the same limitations of expertise that make it
difficult for the instant consumer. In particular, because of the complexity of medical care,
consumers may evaluate medical providers by factors relatively unrelated to the quality of
care. For example, a given medical provider may have an undeservedly good reputation
because of friendly office staff, spacious facilities, and short waiting times even if the doctor
is borderline incompetent as a diagnostician or unwilling to immediately prescribe useful
treatment for fear running afoul of insurers. Conversely, a technically excellent physician
may have only a so-so reputation because weak interpersonal skills or because she is a
woman, member of a racial or ethnic minority, or of foreign origin.
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where doctors are not taking new patients). Routine doctor visits,
prescription fills, or diagnostic tests, although different than a trip to the
supermarket, are not so different that the consumer can not make
observations, gather experience, and adjust "buying" behavior. Where
medical care is urgent, medical events infrequent, and care decisions highly
complex or specialized, consumers have little real chance to perform as
intelligent consumers. But in many situations, they do.
Contrast this with health insurance. First, for many working
Americans, the choice of health insurer is as a practical matter severely
truncated. The good news is that for workers who receive health insurance
as a fringe benefit, they have health insurance that is "free" or at least
heavily subsidized by the employer.33 The bad news is that they are at the
33. But the cost of group health care is of course anything but free. See Health
Premiums Rise 6.1%; Average Family Coverage Costs $12,000, INS. J., Sept. 12, 2007,
available at http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2007/09/12/83416.htm.
(discussing Employer Health Benefits Survey by Kaiser Family Foundation and Health
Research and Educational Trust). Accord, Emily Fredrix, Costs rise for health insurance,
L.V. REV. J., Sept. 12, 2007 at DI, col 4. See also Milt Freudenheim, At a Small Business,
One Illness Can Send Insurance Costs Soaring, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 2007, A1, col. 4. Jerry
Geisel, HMO rate hikes to decelerate again in 2007: Survey, Bus. INS., Mar. 15, 2007, p.
25 (HMOs report "seeking rate increases averaging 11.7% for 2007;" despite the double-
digit increase, it was "the forth consecutive year of declining rate increases, according to a
consulting firm's analysis."). In addition, the amount employer-subsidized group insurance
in force is shrinking. See Krugman, supra note 18, at 231 (declining from 62.1 percent in
1987 to 59.5 percent in 2005).
Most families, of course, do not realize that they are paying an average of $12,000
per year in insurance premiums because much of the cost is bome by the employer of at
least one of the adult family members. But they "pay," of course in that the employer-
funded portion of insurance is taken out of the employee's paycheck prior to receipt by the
employee, as is the employee's portion of the premium payment. As market-oriented
commentators are correct to point out, this has the effect of shielding the true cost of
insurance from workers and consumers, with many thinking of it as a "free" perk that comes
with the job. This in turn undoubtedly makes the worker/consumer less cognizant of price
increases and less reactive than would be the case in a normal over-the-counter market
transaction.
My point, however, is that even if the consumer was slapped in the face with these
premium costs, the market for insurance would be a very imperfect one. First, as discussed
in text, individual consumers are pretty ill-equipped to be intelligent and effective
purchasers of medical insurance. Second, when actually feeling the pain of $1,000 a month
in premiums, many consumers will be reluctant to purchase the type of medical insurance
they need and will often foolishly forgo insurance altogether both because of other pressing
financial needs and because the "endowment effect" of having the money in their pockets
will make it more painful for them to purchase the insurance with after-tax dollars than to
suffer indirectly through the largely employer-funded group health system. In addition,
there is the problem of individual consumer loss of buying power when converted to
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mercy of whatever group health insurer(s) or plan(s) the employer has
arranged.34 At most, the typical employer will have arranged for one or
two HMO options and one or two different preferred provider networks
from which the consumer can choose." If the employee is dissatisfied with
the work-related group insurance options, he can in theory go to a different
insurer, but it will cost him foregone benefits (the employer subsidy is
wasted) as well as substantial out-of-pocket costs in addition to significant
search costs spent selecting a competing insurer. As a practical matter,
then, there is no effective choice of insurers for many workers, although
they are the "lucky" ones in the United States because they at least have
medical insurance.
Where the individual consumer is shopping for individual medical
insurance, the problems are daunting. Many insurers will simply not be
interested in serving this market at all. Those that are by definition are not
doing as well as they would like selling more lucrative group insurance or
stop-loss policies to self-insuring employers. The insurance products
offered will be complex and difficult for the average consumer to
understand or obtain information regarding the proposed policy and its
applications.
Consider the matter of pre-existing conditions. By now, most educated
Americans have at least heard about restrictions on coverage for pre-
existing conditions. But they are unlikely to know how the restriction will
be applied in practice. Even a trained lawyer reading judicial opinions on
purchasing individual insurance rather than participating through an employer-sponsored
group plan.
34. See Charles Duhigg, Aging, Frail and Fighting Insurers to Pay Up, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 26, 2007, Al, col. 3 (describing travails of insured attempting to obtain coverage (to
which she pretty clearly seems entitled) from long-term care insurer); Robert Pear, Loss of
Competition Is Seen in Health Insurance Industry, N.Y. TIMES, Sunday, April 30, 2006, 19,
col. 4; Report Finds Limited Competition In Nation 's Health Insurance Market, INS. J., April
21, 2006, available at www.insurancejournal.com/news/nationa/2006/04/21/67456.htm.
35. And if the employer-provided group health plan is not sufficient for the patient's
needs, the patient or her family may face substantial uninsured medical bills. See John
Carryrou, As Medical Costs Soar, The Insured Face Huge Tab: Jim Dawson Hit Cap After
Hospital Padding; The $1.2 Million Bill, WALL ST. J., Nov. 29, 2007 at AI, col. 4; Chad
Terhune, Covering the Uninsured, But Only up to $25,000, WALL ST. J., April 18, 2007, Al,
col. 4 (describing limits of Tennessee program to provide private medical insurance to the
uninsured); Milt Freudenheim, The Check is Not in the Mail: Late Payment of Medical
Calims Adds to the Cost of Health Care, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 2006 at C1, col. 2. See also
Benesowitz v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 870 N.E.2d 1136 (N.Y. 2007) (enforcing medical
insurance coverage limitation for pre-existing conditions; rejecting insured argument of
violation of state regulation).
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the subject would have difficulty giving a client ironclad advice about
whether his or her prior medical problems make the exclusion or restriction
applicable, much less whether the insurer will force the policyholder to
litigate seeking coverage under various possible scenarios.
36
Contingency is of course at the heart of insurance. People buy medical
insurance because of the contingent risk of developing health problems.
Even with the risks of adverse selection and moral hazard (both which tend
to be overstated in this context),37 consumers are unlikely to have any real
idea of whether they will be health "winners" (who have only a few
significant adverse medical events in their lives) or health "losers" (who
have more than their share of health problems or injuries). They are
certainly unlikely to be able to predict the cost of these events and the
outcomes. A buyer of health insurance may skate through life without
more than annual check-ups or may become a regular prescription user
subject to several expensive operations or chronic expensive treatment.
Thus, right at the outset, a prospective purchaser of insurance is at a
practical loss to know what type of coverage and what amount of coverage
is needed.
The consumer thus depends on the insurer to put together and market
an apt product for the contingencies facing the consumer. To the extent the
product is standardized, comparison shopping, at least according to
premiums charged, is facilitated. But where policies differ at the margin
(and medical insurance is less standardized than life, auto, and general
liability insurance), comparison again becomes difficult because the
differences will be hard to detect and hard to decipher when detected.
Unlike large businesses, individuals are far less likely to have the services
of a knowledgeable broker, independent agent, or attorney who can note
and explain the differences.
Most difficult, however, for comparison purposes is that the consumer
will not readily be able to predict the insurer's behavior in the event of a
claim. Among insurance insiders, certain carriers are known to be more
hospitable, even magnanimous, toward claims while other insurers have a
reputation for fighting many claims on technicalities and even lapsing
toward bad faith too often in an effort to maximize profits at the expense of
the insurer's fiduciary-like duty to its insureds. But most consumers lack
any such information. Like lambs led to the slaughter, they may joyously
36. See, e.g., Benesowitz v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 870 N.E.2d 1136 (N.Y. 2007).
37. See Peter Siegleman, Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: An Exaggerated
Threat, 113 YALE L.J. 1223 (2004).
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march into the arms of an insurer that offers a seemingly comprehensive
product at relatively low cost only to find that if a claim arises (particularly
a big claim), the insurer fights it with a ferocity typically found among
revolutionary guerillas.
Even for sophisticated business consumers of insurance, it is hard to
predict whether the insurer will be difficult or reasonable regarding claims.
Individual claims adjusters may vary. The insurer may have personnel
changes at the top that convert a formerly reasonable insurer to one that
fights every claim tooth and nail. The insurer may decide to outsource its
claims function to a third party administrator (TPA), managing general
agent (MGA), or independent adjuster. The chosen entity may be
competent and reasonable or may be incompetent and excessively stingy,
owing to either its low cost and lack of training/expertise38 or to a
philosophy holding that a tough claims stance will increase insurer profit
and future use of the claims entity. The situation may get better or worse
depending on intervening judicial decisions. A jurisdiction that put
constraints on insurer self-dealing at the beginning of a policy period may
issue a new opinion giving insurers more discretion that may in turn result
in more obstreperous claims stances.
Most important, the insurance contract is aleatory, no matter how
sophisticated the consumer or business purchasing insurance. An aleatory
contract is one in which the exchange is, unlike most contracts, not equal.
The insurance policy could be anything from a great deal to an abysmal
bargain for the participants. 39 For example, if the insurer has no claims
38. See, e.g., Gallagher Bassett Services, Inc. v. Jeffcoat, 887 So.2d 777, 779-80
(Miss. 2004) (describing independent adjuster retained by insurer and its performance,
which included assigning an individual adjuster to the case who was not licensed in the
relevant state, had no training in matters pertinent to the claim, was unaware of relevant
state law regarding "stacking" of insurance benefits until advised by claimant's counsel,
failed to obtain necessary legal opinion, misrepresented her efforts to claimant, and failed to
obtain relevant coverage documentation necessary to make determination of claim;
Incredibly, court deems this litany of failing mere negligence as a matter of law and
insufficient evidence of gross negligence necessary to maintain claim against adjuster,
overturning jury verdict finding gross negligence).
39. Regarding insurance policies as aleatory contracts, see JEFFREY W. STEMPEL,
STEMPEL ON INSURANCE. CONTRACTS § 1.06 (3d ed. 2006 & Supp. 2008); EMERIC FISCHER,
PETER NASH SWISHER & JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, PRINCIPALS OF INSURANCE LAW § 2.02 (Rev.
3d ed. 2006 & Supp. 2006); GEORGE E. REJDA, PRINCIPLES OF RISK MANAGEMENT AND
INSURANCE 99 (9th ed. 2005) ("An aleatory contract is a contract where the values
exchanged may not be equal but depend on an uncertain event. Depending on chance, one
party may receive a value out of proportion to the value that is given.") (emphasis removed);
MARK DORFMAN, INTRODUCTION TO RISK MANAGEMENT AND INSURANCE 163 (8th ed. 2005)
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during a policy period, the premium received is almost pure profit that
earns investment income forever more. Alternatively, the insured may be
severely injured the day after becoming subject to coverage. Even if the
insurer behaves dishonorably in response to this type of claim, it will
almost certainly pay far more in benefits and disputing costs than it ever
received in premiums from the particular claimant in question.40
Conversely, the policyholder may in some cases receive coverage far in
excess of premiums paid or in other cases pay premiums for decades and
receive nothing in return. (This is not impossible even though everyone
gets sick once in awhile. The insured may never be sick enough, often
enough to exceed the deductible amount of the policy, which is shouldered
by the insured).
In short, one does not know who wins or loses regarding an insurance
purchase until years or even decades letter. Contrast this to most other
consumer purchases. Even where the good or service bought is complex or
expensive (e.g., a car, a home), the exchange is thought to be equal,
because the parties are able to make a real time comparative evaluation of
value. A resident of Omaha, Nebraska may think the consumer is nuts to
have paid $500,000 for a two-bedroom house in Silicon Valley, but this is
the price the market has set and it may make sense in light of the
consumer's objectives (e.g., a short commute to Google headquarters in
which he not only works but effectively lives for twenty hours each day),
("The aleatory feature of insurance policies differs from other [commutative] business
contracts where consideration of equal value is exchanged.") (emphasis removed).
40. But applied to its book of business as a whole, insurers may find that acting
dishonorably is profitable. Although they may ultimately pay far more in benefits than was
received in premiums for a particular policyholder, the insurer's war-of-attrition may
succeed in getting insureds to drop meritorious claims or settle them at pennies on the
dollar.
Unless the claim is sufficiently large, the insured will have trouble finding an
attorney willing to take the case on a contingent fee basis (unless the insurer's position is so
clearly unreasonable that it makes a bad faith suit with punitive damages likely, but caps on
such damages may make a small dollar case of even egregious insurer misconduct
unattractive to plaintiffs' lawyers). For most people, this means they cannot obtain legal
representation because their budgets preclude them from paying counsel's normal hourly
rate. In addition, the insurer's "tough" stance on claims may become sufficiently known to
further discourage lawyers from becoming involved and to prompt early, "lowball"
settlements with policyholders.
Perhaps most important, an insurer-wide policy of stringing out claims payments
as long as possible permits the insurer to reclaim through investment income whatever
underwriting loss it may have suffered in connection with individual instances of insureds
who incur covered medical costs in excess of the amount of premiums paid to insurers.
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which are not contingent in the manner of fortuitous health problems or
other loss events. As a general rule of economics, we do not look past the
observed purchasing preferences of consumers. If a thirteen-year-old
thinks that a Hannah Montana album is worth $14.99, that's its value, no
matter how much one's own taste may run in a different musical direction.
The parties can value the exchange as they see fit even if third parties may
question their taste or valuation.
But insurance is different - particularly for the consumer - because it is
an economic transaction centered on risk and contingency. Insurers and
more sophisticated business entities can mitigate the uncertainty of the
aleatory contract by making actuarial calculations based on experience,
comparable population data, or longitudinal studies. Most important, they
pool contingent risks and through the law of large numbers can make
reasonably well-calculated estimates regarding future medical care needs.
By contrast, consumers will either lack access to such information or as
practical matter be unable to expend the money and time necessary for such
evaluations. The typical individual is simply not in a position to be a very
intelligent consumer of insurance, particularly health insurance.
Currently, the private sector provides some counterweight to this
imbalance of expertise through the dominance of employer-provided group
medical insurance. In contrast to the individual insured, the employer has
the resources, experience, and leverage to make better estimates and strike
better bargains with private insurers. But this field-leveling power of the
employer remains less powerful than the accumulated expertise and
resources of the insurance industry.
More important, employers may not have the motivation to fully
deploy their resources on behalf of insured workers. Despite its
responsibilities as a benefits provider, the employer's zeal will be diluted
by a desire to keep costs down. It will be tempted to spend less for inferior
coverage from a difficult insurer so long as not hard-pressed by the
workforce. Individual workers are unlikely to apply such pressure. Unions
are more likely to be effective advocates for employee group insureds, but
unions have declined in membership to the point where only about 15
percent of the workforce is organized. Employer-provided insurance as a
whole has declined in recent years as well.4'
For many employers, minimalist group insurance is their optimal
economic strategy. Prospective workers are looking primarily for a job
rather than medical coverage (which is why the danger of adverse selection
41. See Jost, Health Insurance a Bad Idea?, supra note 4.
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is overstated) and, as discussed above, have only limited expertise about
medical insurance. Consequently, workers and job applicants will not exert
particularly powerful leverage forcing employers to achieve optimal
medical coverage for their workforces. We cannot be completely confident
that employers will be faithful agents of employees concerning the
purchase of medical insurance.
B. THE LEGAL FICTION OF INDIVIDUAL CONTROL OF
HEALTH
The second legal fiction, which also becomes part of the legal friction
between individualism and collective solidarity, is the increasing tendency
to implicitly assign fault to persons experiencing adverse health events and
medical costs. More important, the typical consumer will not have much if
any effective control over his or her medical care needs and costs. But
because of the John Wayne mythology of rugged individualism and
personal responsibility, society (and analysts and policymakers who should
know better) act as if the individual has some meaningful control over his
or her health. For example, people frequently refer to someone "beating"
cancer or "battling" illness, as though one's failure to stay healthy or
recover were solely a function of one's efforts and abilities.42 In reality,
good or bad health, more than economic success or emotional happiness,
42. See SUSAN SONTAG, ILLNESS AS METAPHOR (1978)(describing her struggles with
breast cancer and noting social tendency to see illness and treatment as analogous to
protagonist in conflict with adverse entity rather than fortuitous circumstances controlled by
genetics or inexorable environmental factors). See also DAVID RIEFF, SWIMMING IN A SEA OF
DEATH (2008) (Sontag's son chronicles her myriad medical problems and attempts to
overcome them).
One particular example of this tendency in popular culture sticks in my mind.
During the 1970s and 1980s, sportscasters often referred to Jack Pardee, a former Los
Angeles Rams coach and one-time star player (a linebacker for the Rams and the
Washington Redskins) as "beating" black mole cancer, expressing some awe due to the
rareness of recovery from the disease at that time.
This, of course, is an empirically ridiculous way of putting it. Pardee was a great
player and a tough guy. But he did not vanquish his cancer. He recovered from it through
good medical care and luck. His recovery was not a testament to any moral, mental or
physical superiority just as it would not indicate deficiency in these areas had he died from
the cancer. Depending on chance circumstances, the same type of virus might kill Arnold
Schwarzenegger but leave Pee Wee Herman relatively unscathed. Strength, athletic ability,
intelligence, and determination have little or nothing to do with whether one gets sick or
recovers. But we continue to talk about illness in these misleading terms.
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results far more from chance than from personal decisionmaking, conduct,
discipline or effort.43
For years, insurers have waged a semantic and psychological campaign
against the notion of blameless fortuity in adverse events and at least
suggested that many losses are not true accidents of chance but are to a
significant degree the fault of insureds. For example, automobile mishaps
are no longer labeled "accidents" by most insurance personnel. Instead,
they are trained to speak of "collisions" and "crashes" that imply fault on at
least someone's part (usually the driver covered by another insurer).44 In
health insurance, this more generally takes the form of the suggestion that
while the insured does not knowingly become ill, the insured's lifestyle and
negligence may have created or contributed to the health problem that now
requires medical care. 45 This view, although possessed of some merit in
the aggregate, is generally not a productive way to think about individual
medical needs and insurance claims.
In a large enough group of persons, their lifestyles will at least in some
cases ultimately show significant impact on adverse health events and
consequent medical care. For example, a group of chain smokers will
eventually have much higher rates of heart disease, lung cancer,
emphysema, and related maladies associated with smoking while a similar
group of nonsmokers will, absent other factors, have fewer such adverse
health events and lower medical care costs.
In the aggregate, it therefore makes considerable sense to promote the
reduction of medical risk through encouraging better lifestyles among
insurers. Programs to promote exercise, healthy eating, nonsmoking,
moderation in alcohol use, and avoidance of illegal drugs or unregulated
43. See Jacobi, supra note 4, at 562 (noting that ten percent of population "accounts
for almost 70 percent of the health care costs, and the top 2 percent accounts for almost 40
percent of the costs.").
44. See RICHARD V. ERICSON, AARON DOYLE & DEAN BARRY, INSURANCE AS
GOVERNANCE Ch. 3 (2003). For one example of the tremendous public relations resources
deployed by the insurance industry, see Peter J. Howe, Firm He Hired to Buff Image is
Suing Mogul; Cambridge PR Shop Says it's Owed $2M, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 10, 2007
(public relations firm eSapience Ltd alleges former AIG CEO and insurance executive
Maurice "Hank" Greenberg owes $2 million for services purchased when he sought to
burnish his image tarnished by then-New York Attorney General and later Governor Eliot
Spitzer's investigation of AIG; bills ranged as high as $978,000 for a month's assistance in
presenting Greenberg in "best light and to assure the presence and participation of key
intellectual and public figures" at events involving Greenberg, according to complaint).
45. See Mariner, Social Solidarity and Personal Responsibility in Health Reform,
supra note 22.
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supplements all help group members as a whole, society, the medical
profession, and reduce medical care usage and costs.
Paradoxically, however, the current system of crazy-quilt private
patchwork insurance does little to foster these efforts. Most insurers fail to
cover many potential efforts to enhance prevention of illness through better
lifestyle. Historically, private insurers have been slow to cover preventive
medical care such as annual checkups. This appears to result from a
combination of short-sightedness, concern about overuse of this type of
benefit, and the more calculatingly disturbing but perhaps correct business
decision that paying for prevention in the instant policy period simply
lowers some future insurer's cost of covered care in subsequent policy
periods.46
But whatever the merits of preventive care and a health lifestyle, I find
it disturbing that so much of modem health care and insurance rhetoric
seems to uncritically accept the notion that much of medical need results
from the insured patient's own failings of discipline rather than the simply
fortuity of genetics and luck. Although a group as a whole will reflect the
benefits of healthy lifestyle, individuals within the group may or may not
enjoy the benefit. For example, a non-smoker who wins marathons and has
low blood pressure and cholesterol may nonetheless drop dead from a
sudden heart attack. Or he may be stricken with cancer. Or rear-ended by
a truck. Or infected while making a blood donation.
Conversely, the 300-pounder who stands 5'8" tall and smokes two
packs a day may live to be 100. When observers conclude that because
each individual within a group demonstrates the whole group's
characteristics, they make what statisticians term the "ecological" fallacy.47
For example, it would be erroneous to conclude that every union member
46. This is why also why Hyman is overly optimistic in positing medical insurers will
engage in an optimal level of preventive care in the absence of government regulation. See
Hyman, Health Insurance: Market Failure or Government Failure?, supra note 4. In
addition, as Mariner notes, preventive care and wellness programs raise the prospect of
deviating from the fortuity model of insurance and creating a situation that (like HSAs,
HRAs and other consumer-driven proposals) tends to benefit the upper socioeconomic strata
much more than their lower SES counterparts. See Mariner, Social Solidarity and Personal
Responsibility in Health Reform, supra note 22.
47. See Jerry Mashaw, The Economics and Politics the Understanding of Public Law,
65 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 123, 150 (1989) ("Behavior found to characterize a population, at the
population level, has been fallaciously assumed to characterize the behavior of individuals
in the population"); Gerald Kramer, The Ecological Fallacy Revisited: Aggregate-versus-
Individual Findings on Economics, Elections, and Sociopolitical Voting, 77 AM. POL. SCI.
REv. 92 (1983).
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voting in a Democratic primary supported John Edwards, although it is true
that he enjoyed (at least during the early stages of the 2008 campaign)
considerable support from that group as a whole. Non-statisticians
intrinsically realize that this is incorrect but are often overly casual in
stereotyping based on subconscious application of the fallacy (e.g., looking
at a plumber with a lunch pail on his way to the polls and assuming he is a
vote for Edwards).
Much of the rhetoric about consumer/patient responsibility in health
care comes dangerously close to embracing the ecological fallacy. It
suggests, at least implicitly, that people with health problems are at least
partially responsible and that it is therefore unfair or unwise to pool them
with people who are comparatively free of health problems or the need for
expensive medical treatment. This attitude is simply not rational as applied
to the serendipitous nature of health problems and the need for medical
care.
Only in extreme cases (e.g., the self-destructive risk-taker, the
spendthrift hypochondriac), can it legitimately be said that individual
patients had a significant role in maladies that have afflicted them or the
total amount and cost of treatment. Much of adverse health and medical
experience results from simple bad luck. It is wrong to suggest, even
indirectly, that this results from the patient's failures and that the patient is
therefore less deserving of adequate medical care and insurance coverage
than those blessed with better medical fortune.48
But the rhetoric in much of the health care and insurance debate, even
if not strictly inaccurate, is slanted in favor of overstating the individual's
control over her health history and the relative desert of certain individuals.
For example, use of a term such as "personal responsibility" is simply
overdone and misleading for many health issues. 49 A person stricken by
48. See Deborah Stone, Beyond Moral Hazard: Insurance as Moral Opportunity, 6
CONN. INS. L.J. 11, 12 (1999).
49. But this terminology is so hard-wired into our discussions of medical issues that it
pervades even scholarly treatments that do not embrace an unrealistic view of an
individual's ability to control his own health care options. See, e.g., Mariner, Social
Solidarity, supra note 22; Lois Shepherd, Assuming Responsibility, 41 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 445 (2005); Carol A. Heimer, Responsibility in Health Care: Spanning the Boundary
Between Law and Medicine, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 465 (2005); Lois Shepherd, Face To
Face: A Call for Radical Responsibility in Place of Compassion, 77 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 445
(2003). Reading the titles of these articles alone, one might first erroneously assume that
they are part of the John Wayne ethos when they are in fact written from a communitarian
social justice (Mariner, Shepherd) or professionalism (Heimer) perspective. The rhetoric of
market, rugged individualism, and aversion to government programs is so strong in the U.S.
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cancer clearly is not at fault. A person injured in an auto accident or
workplace mishap may have been negligent but this hardly amounts to
personally irresponsibility. As the insurance industry well knows,
everybody is negligent at times but not every instance of negligence results
in damage to self or others. Although behavior may contribute to problems
with diabetes, heart or lung disease, much of medical outcome is a
metaphorical roll of the hereditary and biological dice. Personal
responsibility rhetoric implicitly blames people more accurately described
as victims and provides a subconscious salve permitting society to overlook
the problem of an inadequate national approach to medical coverage.
A term like "actuarial fairness, '50 although it may be technically
accurate and useful in describing risk populations, is also rhetorically
overloaded with the connotation that sick people have largely been their
own worst enemies (or at least must lump their conditions). Implicitly,
providing coverage to those making higher demands on the medical system
is "unfair" to those at lower risk or presenting fewer current demands. This
nomenclature makes it easier to avoid a sufficiently comprehensive
solution because it implicitly suggests that any government efforts
extending beyond a market-based solution is unfair to the bulk of society
and unfairly subsidizes the medical needs of the undeserving.
The net effect of this type of discourse is to reinforce the traditional
American notions of rugged individualism and the optimal efficiency of
markets, creating a climate where policymakers can implicitly take the
position that doing more for those who are sicker, poorer, or less skilled in
navigating the world carries too high a price tag, both economically (e.g.,
higher taxes, higher premiums, higher medical costs) and socially (e.g.,
enhancement of the "nanny state" in derogation of the preferred ethos of
rugged individualism).
In addition to being an unfair attack on the ill and the risky, the rhetoric
of individualism and market veneration is amazingly unempathetic. John
Wayne was able to achieve his goals in large part because he was never
seriously injured or ill, at least not prior to accomplishing his mission."
that the immediate connotative reaction (mine, at least) to the term "personal responsibility"
is to assume the speaker is advocating a "let the chips fall" position in which the individual
stands alone, protected only by contract and individual fortitude.
50. See Mariner, Social Solidarity, supra note 22 (using term throughout and also
using term "personal responsibility" throughout).
51. In the 1969 movie TRUE GRIT, for which he won an Oscar, Wayne was wounded
while dispatching the villain but the seriousness of the wound, which ultimately did him in,
did not manifest itself until after the shooting was over. TRuE GRIT (Paramount Pictures
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Today, some health insurance commentators would seemingly be unwilling
to chalk up adverse health events to fortuitous chance and would instead
wonder whether they had instead not brought this upon themselves through
lifestyle factors (e.g., smoking, poor diet, insufficient sleep, poor
hygiene).52 This implicit appeal to the John Wayne iconography of
America is used as a selling point for certain insurance and financial
products by appealing to the public through rhetoric about "consumer
choice" or "freedom" or an "ownership society" when these initiatives will,
for most people, be far less helpful than a government-administered single
payer system.
53
1969). Of course, defenders of rugged individualism might suggest this simply
demonstrated will power (such as in the famous Jesse Ventura line (in the movie
COMMANDO, which also starred a similarly macho-iconographic Arnold Schwarzenegger) "I
ain't got time to bleed" until the mission is completed). COMMANDO (SLM Production
Group 1985). While the laws of biology and physics (e.g., blood escapes rapidly when one
is shot in a vital organ) may be suspended in Hollywood, they very much limit the ability of
ill persons to surmount their maladies through exercises of personal responsibility.
52. See, e.g., NATIONAL GOVERNORS ASSOCIATION, MEDICAID REFORM A
PRELIMINARY REPORT FROM THE NATIONAL GOVERNORS ASSOCIATION (2005),
http://www.nga.org/cda/files/0506medicaid.pdf (positing need for "incentives and penalties
for individuals to take more responsibility for their health care"); Craig Thomas,
Understanding Rural Health Care Needs and Challenges: Why Access Matters to Rural
Americans, 43 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 253, 255 (2006) (in addressing needed actions on health
care, U.S. Senator Thomas argues that "most importantly, individuals must take personal
responsibility for their health"); Richard L. Kaplan, Who's Afraid of Personal
Responsibility? Health Savings Accounts and the Future of American Health Care, 36
McGEORGE L. REv. 535 (2005). But see Shepherd, Assuming Responsibility, supra note 49
(taking different perspective and placing responsibility on society to provide medical care
and alleviate suffering for the ill); Heimer, supra note 49 (focusing primarily on
responsibility of medical professionals to patients and society).
53. See Deborah Stone, Health Law Symposium: The False Promise of Consumer
Choice, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 475, 475 (2007) ("In these times, the new buzzwords for
market reform are 'consumer choice,' 'consumer direction,' 'consumer empowerment,' and
'ownership.' [T]he rhetorical emphasis on power and control for consumers disguises the
real impact of market reforms, which is primarily to reduce the collective assistance and
medical services that citizens receive."). See also Monahan, Ownership Society, supra note
17 (finding useful incentive structures in consumer-driven plans but also that consumers are
not particularly adept purchasers of health care).
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The Legal Fiction of the Reliable Responsibility of Individuals (and
the Contradictory Legal Fiction that Individuals Are Louts Who Need
Stern Market and Insurer Discipline)
In addition to the rhetoric about personal responsibility concerning
illness itself, there is also the suggestion in much of the debate that persons
lacking adequate insurance when illness strikes are in this pickle largely
through their own failure to pay the required social toll of insurance. For
example, we are frequently reminded that many who do not receive
medical insurance through a job will go without insurance rather than pay
premiums for an individual policy. Some may even describe this as a
rational decision but one that adversely affects the nation's ability to
provide medical insurance that is properly funded by those who will benefit
from it. For example, younger persons who are less statistically likely to
have medical problems often fail to purchase insurance. As a result, the
private insurance system is deprived of their premium dollars and the
insurance system as a whole is underfunded. But when a twenty-eight-
year-old ruptures an appendix, he will generally be able to obtain treatment
at an emergency room.
The picture painted, with considerable justification, is that people like
this are freeloading on the system. In reaction, even those favoring
continued substantial reliance on private medical insurance urge that such
persons be required to purchase insurance and heavily penalized if they do
not. This is a major underpinning of the well-publicized Massachusetts
plan and the health care proposals of Hillary Clinton and John Edwards.54
This is not the place to discuss mandates at length but it should be
noted that mandates tend to be far less effectual than commonly
supposed. 55 Consider auto insurance, where for decades every state has
54. For a summary of the Massachusetts plan, see Elizabeth A. Weeks, Failure to
Connect: The Massachusetts Plan for Individual Health Insurance, 55 KAN. L. REv. 1283
(2007).
55. See Hyman, Good, Bad & Ugly, supra note 14, at 1111 (expressing skepticism
about efficacy of insurance purchase mandates); Gilles, The Judgment-Proof Society, 63
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 603 , 705 (2006)(noting difficulties with and practical limitations on
suggested liability insurance purchase mandates); Logue, The Current Life Insurance Crisis:
How The Law Should Respond, 32 CUMB. L. REv. 1, 45 (2002) (mandates create collateral
problems such as affordability for the poor and lower middle-class); John Jacobi, The Ends
of Health Insurance, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 311, 388 (1997) (describing mandated purchase
of health insurance as "politically problematic"); David A. Hyman, Professional
Responsibility, Legal Malpractice, and the Eternal Triangle: Will Lawyers or Insurers Call
the Shots?, 4 CONN. INS. L.J. 353, 370 (1997) (noting lack of success of movement to
2008]
HeinOnline -- 14 Conn. Ins. L.J. 257 2007-2008
258 CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL
had financial responsibility laws that require, as a condition for licensing a
motor vehicle, that the owner purchase and maintain auto insurance. The
required minimum amounts of such insurance are shockingly low in many
states and the premiums, although non-trivial, are hardly astronomical, at
least for the low policy limits minimally required. However, experience
shows that a large portion of the driving public fails to maintain the
required insurance.56
There is little reason to think that medical insurance mandates will be
significantly more effective. The reason: many people, especially at the
economic margin, will shirk legal obligations that cost money if they can
do so without significant penalty. In response, proponents of mandated
purchase of private insurance seek to use penalties to create sufficient
incentive for citizens to purchase required insurance. Although like auto
insurance financial responsibility laws, this will work to a degree and
improve upon an unfettered free market atmosphere, there is no reason to
think that it will work better overall than auto insurance.
Most likely, it will work less well. At least for a few hours on a given
Tuesday, anyone wanting a license plate will need to have at least some
auto insurance in force. By contrast, there is no similar mandatory event, at
least not one occurring prior to when insurance is needed, which will apply
to all potential policyholders. The twenty-something Starbucks worker and
the impoverished family of four can more easily bypass insurance
mandates than can their driving counterparts. Absent a police state-like
increase in law enforcement infrastructure, they will be seriously
scrutinized and "caught" in their failure to procure insurance only after they
have suffered an adverse medical event.57
mandate malpractice insurance for lawyers); James E. Holloway, ERISA, Preemption and
Comprehensive Federal Health Care, A Call for "Cooperative Federalism" to Preserve the
States' Role in Formulating Health Care Policy, 16 CAMPBELL L. REv. 405, 422 (1994)
(noting that mandates alone do not "provide benefits for the unemployed, indigent, and
uninsurable"); Katherine Pratt, Funding Health Care with an Employer Mandate:
Efficiency and Equity Concerns, 39 ST. Louis L.J. 155 (1994). But see Tom Baker,
Containing the Promise of Insurance: Adverse Selection and Risk Classification, 9 CONN.
INS. L.J. 371, 380 (2002)(finding potential significant utility in health insurance purchase
mandates).
56. See Rebecca Cathcart, California Taking Aim At Uninsured On the Roads, N. Y.
TIMES, Dec. 3, 2007, at A22 (Twenty-five percent of California drivers uninsured despite
longstanding requirement of insurance purchase as prerequisite for licensing car).
57. See Jost, Bad Idea?, supra note 4 (noting studies showing reduced use of medical
services by uninsured and failure of younger, healthier demographic groups to purchase
medical insurance).
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But we continue to think of mandated private insurance as
comprehensive solution to the health insurance problem, just as we have
viewed mandated auto insurance as an effective public policy tool. This is
unwise. A sufficiently high number of persons will fail to purchase
medical insurance and pay premiums into the system for funding expanded
health care. Whether this occurs because they are irresponsible shirkers
and slackers or because they are simply too poor, unsophisticated, or
unorganized to make the required purchase is beside the point - or at least
beside my point.
My point is that even the "progressives" or "reformers" in the area of
medical insurance, driven by perceived political pragmatism if not
thorough analysis, have erroneously viewed private insurance purchase
mandates as a near-panacea in large part out of misplaced continued belief
in the legal fiction of the effectiveness of individual personal responsibility.
At a minimum, this legal fiction posits that if required to purchase
insurance, individuals will do so promptly and responsibly in most all
cases. But if this estimate is correct, people would also purchase medical
insurance even in the absence of mandates and would place such purchases
ahead of other desired goods and services. Historical and empirical
evidence is quite to the contrary. Instead, people either consciously or
negligently fail to obtain insurance, even when they could at least in theory
afford it. A more realistic view of human behavior would embrace the
more enforced community solidarity of a government administered single
payer plan.5 8
In addition, the legal fiction of individual rationality and omniscience
also posits that when purchasing insurance, consumers will do so wisely
and efficiently. But, as discussed above, most laypersons lack the
58. See Stone, False Promise, supra note53, at 478:
[W]hen people live at the margin, they are apt to choose the
option with the lowest short-term costs over the one with the lowest
long-term or total costs. People living at the margin-and that margin
may be well up into the middle class when families face chronic disease,
disability, job loss, income decline, and all the other factors that make
for economic squeeze - are simply not able to behave like the rational
economic actors of consumer choice theory. They cannot afford to take
the long-term view. They are forced to be "penny wise and pound
foolish.
See also id. at 480 ("perhaps the worst feature of the consumer choice
approach" is that "it substitutes lay judgment for professional judgment.").
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knowledge, experience, training, or sophistication to understand and
differentiate insurance products and providers. In contrast to the prevailing
legal fiction, they are not good consumers of medical insurance. Even
when people dutifully follow mandates to buy medical insurance, they will
frequently make suboptimal choices regarding necessary coverage and
make errors in choosing among whatever options are presented to them by
the private market.59 Consequently, a system premised on the wisdom and
utility of consumer choice via John Wayne-style individualism and
invisible hand market behavior is unlikely to achieve sufficiently
comprehensive and adequate medical insurance or medical care for the
population at large.
C. THE LEGAL FRICTION OF MARKET MYTHOLOGY AND RUGGED
INDIVIDUALISM IN TENSION WITH BOTH ITSELF AND IN
TENSION WITH SOCIAL JUSTICE AND COMMUNITY
SOLIDARITY
As discussed above, the American ethos has been to erroneously
assume too much understanding and discipline by the consumer of
insurance and to view with distain the consumer who fails to make good
insurance choices. At the same time, empathy is not completely dead in
American society. We worship idealized concepts of rugged individualism
and personal responsibility but are unwilling to adopt a completely
Darwinian approach to the ill or injured. Although there is a substantial
amount of "blaming the victim," for health problems, Americans do not
completely turn a cold shoulder to the ill or injured. The iconic image of
Martin Luther King and the attendant social justice notion still competes
for the hearts and minds of the public on issues of health care. Similarly,
although the market efficiency wing of Adam Smith's own writings
dominates much of the discourse, his thoughts on the importance of a
59. The Massachusetts plan and similar initiatives attempt to deal with this problem
by placing some requirements on insurers as to the minimum content and features of health
insurance policies sold. Like mandated private coverage itself, this regulatory effort is
better than nothing, but it will leave many consumers without optimal coverage for their
needs. However, to the extent that government-required minimum features of a medical
insurance policy are effective, this is actually a powerful argument for simply traveling the
extra mile to a government administered single payer system. Logically, if regulators can
design an effective basic medical insurance policy, they can also effectively design the
contours of a fair single payer system. See generally Edward A. Zelinsky, The New
Massachusetts Health Law: Preemption and Experimentation, 49 WM. & MARY L. REv. 229
(2007).
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strong, competent, self-regulating professional class also play a role in the
health care debate.
As the politicians continue to remind us during the 2008 election
season, Americans are a compassionate people as well as a group that
worships at the shrines of rugged individualism, personal responsibility and
ambition. As a consequence, despite some rhetorical and social looking
askance at the obese, the slothful, smokers, drunkards, and druggies,
society (even its insurance element) has been unwilling to completely
exclude most such people from coverage they would otherwise receive as
members of an insured risk pool.
The inability of the body politic to adopt either the cold-hearted
approach of letting the health or poor consumer choice chips fall where
they may or the more emphatic communitarian approach of comprehensive
universal health care leads to the legal friction or tension between
allegiance to the norms of rugged individualism and personal responsibility
and the recognition that, at least in the arena of human health, outcomes are
often not within the control of the individual.
The result is, much like American medical insurance itself, a
patchwork of occasionally spotty coverage that for the most part provides
coverage even for the Louie Andersons (overweight) and Humphrey
Bogarts (smoker) of the world but does so in a manner that may impose
additional costs or reduced coverage, particularly when that person is not
part of a group insurance plan. Increasingly, insurers in general have tried
to restrict coverage accorded to insureds engaged in arguably wrongful or
irresponsible activity and have tried to avoid providing medical insurance
in such cases unless they can extract a sufficiently high premium. For auto
insurers, we see this new judgmentalism in the form of clauses that exclude
coverage if a car accident arises out of the policyholder's intoxicated
driving or criminal act. For health insurers, we see measures such as
broader and longer bans on coverage for pre-existing conditions,
differential premiums rates based on lifestyle factors.
More important for purposes of the health care/medical insurance
debate, the purported fault of patients provides insurers with an argument
against single payer administration of universal coverage even if the
argument is largely made sub silentio. Because of public ambivalence
about how far to take the personal responsibility track in derogation of
compassion, this argument has not been completely successful alone but at
the margin has helped the status quo resist efforts toward universal health
insurance coverage.
But this tension, like most, has strong elements of inconsistency, as
does the so-called consumer driven health care movement. On one hand,
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the theology of market-and-individual driven health care posits that many
people are just too darned undisciplined, lazy and self-destructive and that,
as a result, the costs that they bring upon themselves should not be heavily
subsidized nor should the health consequences of their foibles be borne by
a unified national insurance system. The consumer-driven, market-based
model of medical insurance implicitly belittles individuals as undisciplined
louts who fail to take adequate care of themselves, over-consume expensive
medical care, and fail to exhibit apt discipline in lifestyle, insurance
purchase, or resort to health care.
But on the proverbial other hand, the consumer-driven movement
argues that individuals are sufficiently all-knowing that they don't need
universal health care and single payer medical coverage and that they can
make shrewd, disciplined insurance purchasing decisions. In addition, the
movement posits that people will be similarly shrewd, disciplined, price-
controlling consumers of medical services.
The inconsistency is palpable. The problem, of course, is that slothful
slackers and the shrewd consumers are the same people, or at least
comprise the same population pool. Some subgroup of the populace may
meet the implicit John Wayne/Adam Smith assumptions underlying the
consumer-driven health movement (just as every neighborhood has a few
nerds who never unwittingly violate even the most arcane neighborhood
association rules regarding aesthetics). But this subgroup is logically much
smaller than posited by the movement - and too small to sustain movement
health care. People are not completely incompetent in health matters, but
comparatively few have the education, training, time, discipline, and
energy to manage their medical insurance portfolio in the manner posited
by those favoring continued or increased market control over medical
coverage.
II. THE MYTHOLOGY OF THE MARKET AND OF PRIVATE
INSURER EFFICIENCY
A seemingly stronger arrow in the quiver of the status quo is public
concern that anything but a market-based, private sector model for medical
insurance will be too inefficient and expensive. The Adam Smith legacy of
a belief in omniscient and omnipotent markets has created an unhelpful
mythology positing that private sector health care and insurance is so
dramatically and consistently more efficient than any government-run or
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hybridized model that it should be tinkered with only under the most dire of
circumstances and only to the most limited degree.60
At the risk of picking more of a fight than I have already begun, much
of David Hyman's scholarship is in this vein, although he is also highly
critical of the role of private insurer payers in the current patchwork system
as well as critical of government single payer plans such as Medicare.61
It's clever, knowledgeable, insightful and well-written, with occasionally
counterintuitive nuggets of some support for particular types of regulation
or government efforts on behalf of patient rights.62 But regardless of
whether one finds it persuasive, it seems undeniable that it all proceeds
from a Smithian world view exceedingly enamored of markets and
consumer choice.63 (The Smith who advocated for professionals' financial
60. See Anna Bernasek, Health Care Problem? Check the American Psyche, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 31, 2006, at B3 (noting resistance to government public insurance system based
on American norms).
61. See e.g. Hyman & Silver, The Poor State of Health Care Quality in the US.,
supra note 16, at 959 (2005) ("markets dominated by third-party payment arrangements
function relatively poorly... [p]ayers bear most of the costs of health care; patients enjoy
most of the gains. Payers therefore care about cost more than quality."); David A. Hyman,
Regulating Managed Care: What's Wrong With a Patient Bill of Rights, 73 S. CAL. L. REV.
221 (2001); David A. Hyman, Health Care Fraud and Abuse: Market Change, Social
Norms, and the Trust "Reposed in the Workmen", 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 531 (2001); David A.
Hyman & Charles Silver, Just What the Patient Ordered: The Case for Result-Based
Compensation Arrangements, 29 J. L. MED & ETHICS 170 (2001); David A. Hyman, Drive-
Through Deliveries: Is "Consumer Protection" Just What the Doctor Ordered?, 78 N. C. L.
REv. 5 (1999); David A. Hyman, Patient Dumping and EMTALA: Past Imperfect/Future
Shock, 8 HEALTH MATRIx 29 (1998); David A. Hyman, The Conundrum of Charitability:
Reassessing Tax Exemption for Hospitals, 16 AM. J.L. & MED. 327, 370 (1990) ("In a world
where patients are relatively ignorant about their medical conditions, a for-profit provider
has a clear incentive to cheat on quality and quantity. Because there are no equity
shareholders, nonprofit hospitals may be safer for the relatively helpless patient."). See also
David A. Hyman, Medicine in the New Millennium: A Self-Help Guide for the Perplexed, 26
AM. J.L. & MED. 143, 152 (2000) (on the subject of "picking a fight": relating that his
scholarship was described at one conference as reflecting "the sort of views that caused the
Irish potato famine."). Presumably, I have not gone this far in my differing.
62. See, e.g., Hyman & Silver, The Poor State of Health Care Quality in the U.S.,
supra note 61; David A. Hyman, Does Medicare Care About Quality?, 46 PERSP. IN
BIOLOGY. & MED. 55, 65 (2003) (finding that Medicare does care about quality - but
suggesting that it achieves it less well than would private insurer or uninsured markets).
63. For the best example of all these traits of Hyman scholarship, see DAVID A.
HYMAN, MEDICARE MEETS MEPHISTOPHELES (2006) (discussing fictitious memorandum in
the manner of C.S. Lewis' The Screwtape Letters (1942) revealing Medicare to be diabolic
plot designed to drain Americans of virtues of thrift and truthfulness and lead them into
seven deadly sins of avarice, gluttony, envy, sloth, lust anger and vanity); David A. Hyman,
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success is largely missing in Hyman's work but, like Smith, he holds
professionals to an implicitly high standard of care and competence).
Hyman is hardly alone, at least outside the academy, where the seemingly
dominant view among policymakers is that any comprehensive program to
effect full medical coverage must involve private insurers and that there
should be no program that effectively eliminates private insurers in favor of
government. 64
Notwithstanding its political dominance, the dominant market
paradigm for configuring medical coverage appears substantially incorrect
on a number of grounds. First, despite the supposed marvels of the market
in controlling costs, both health care costs and insurance premium rates are
high and tending higher. Market defenders typically ascribe this to the
effects of government subsidization of group medical insurance, which is
generally a fringe benefit that workers receive as untaxed compensation.
The point has force but not nearly so much as its advocates claim. Even
without tax subsidy, private insurance premiums would likely be high
because of market concentration, generally rising medical costs, strong
demand for coverage, and insurer inability to effectively control costs to
any significantly better degree than the government.
Regardless of whether it is taxed when received by an employee, the
employer's share of group health insurance premiums costs money for the
employer. Although the cost can be deducted as a business expense, the
corresponding reduction in tax liability is not, for most businesses, the
same as avoiding the expenditure altogether. Health insurance still costs
Medicare Meets Mephistopheles, 60 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1165 (2003) (similar, shorter
version of argument).
64. See Hossain, supra note 1, at 1 (noting absence of even Democratic presidential
support for government single-payer insurance or any plan that does not rely substantially
on purchase of private medical insurance). Further, Hyman, albeit sometimes feeling
embattled among the ivory tower types, is not without at least partial support in the academy
as well. See, e.g., Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Our Broken Health Care System and How to Fix
It: An Essay on Health Law and Policy, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 537 (2006) (advocating
continued significant role for private insurance along the lines of Massachusetts plan, with
purchase mandates but subsidies for payment). See also Jacobson, supra note 9, at 734-35
(contending that four conceptual paradigms compete for dominance in health law: economic
(market competitive); professional; rights-based (social justice) and institutional, and that
"social justice model is on hold" which is a "euphemism for being dead in the water.
Instead, the real struggle for doctrinal supremacy in health law is between the market and
professional models."). A soundly administered government single payer system holds the
more promise than the current or market models for achieving professional and institutional
goals as well as social justice and may actually work to enhance meaningful consumer
choice regarding medical services.
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money, which presumably gives employers plenty of incentive to keep
premiums down. In spite of this, premiums consistently rise. Although
this is not necessarily the "fault" of the market for employer-insurer health
care bargaining, it at least demonstrates the strong limitations on this
market as a vehicle for controlling premium costs.
Part of the problem is motivational disconnect between employers, who
see medical insurance as an expensive fringe benefit on which to
economize and workers who get to use the medical care and would like
more, better care. Another part of the problem is that even large employers
may not have as much leverage with insurers as necessary to provide
effective cost control in the face of insurer drive for profit while individuals
are particularly ill-suited to the cost-policing enterprise.65 By contrast, the
65. See Robert Pear, Hard Sell Cited as Insurers Push Plans to Elderly, N.Y. TIMES,
May 7, 2007, at Al; Sarah Lueck, Private Remedy: Insurers Fight to Defend Lucrative
Medicare Business; As Democrats Push Cuts, Trade Group Targets Minority Lawmakers,
WALL ST. J., April 30, 2007, at A1; Milt Freudenheim, A Benefit for Insurers: Medicare
Drug Plan Feeds More Profitable Managed Care, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2006, at Cl. See
also James Bandler, et al., CEO Aims to Halt Stock-Based Pay at UnitedHealth; Move
Comes Amid Scrutiny Of Options Timing, Gains; Suspensions in Vitesse Probe, WALL ST. J.,
April 19, 2006 at Al; George Anders, Health-Care Gold Mines: Middlemen Strike It Rich;
Rewarding Career: As Patients, Doctors Feel Pinch, Insurer's CEO Makes a Billion;
UnitedHealth Directors Strive To Please 'Brilliant' Chief- New Questions on Options;
Selling Trout for 40 Cents a Pound, WALL ST. J., April 18, 2006 at AI. Of course, providers
also try to extract higher prices and maintain or improve their compensation. See Reinhardt,
Economist's Model, supra note 3. But see Vanessa Fuhrmans, Withdrawal Treatment: A
Novel Plan Helps Hospital Wean Itself Off Pricey Tests; It Cajoles Big Insurer to Pay a
Little More for Cheaper Therapies, WALL ST. J., Jan. 12, 2007, at Al (example of cost-
saving methods originated and championed by provider. Hyman makes this point well in
Mephistopheles and other writings). See e.g., Hyman, Patient Bill of Rights, supra note 61.
A large part of my problem with Hyman's analysis is his relative overemphasis on provider
profit (particularly physician compensation) as compared to the problems of private insurer
charges and profiteering, which in my view leave problems of provider compensation
(particularly physician compensation) in the dust.
Even more troublesome from my point of view is the differential human cost of
provider avarice in contrast to insurer avarice. Provider avarice may increase costs but
should mean, at least in theory (and mostly in practice) that patients get more care and more
than adequate care. But see Hyman, Medicare Meets Mephistopheles, supra note 63, at
1183 ("Shoveling money out the door to purchase health care services is, of course, not the
same thing as purchasing high-quality health care."). By contrast, insurer avarice is
manifested in claim denial that may lead to severe injury or even death for a patient unable
to obtain coverage; see Jane Zhang, Chronic Condition: Amid Fight for Life, A Victim of
Lupus Fights for Insurance; Lost in U.S. Health-Care Maze, Her Coverage Was Ended As
Her Illness Worsened; Skipping a $2,000 CT Scan, WALL ST. J., Dec. 5, 2006, at Al. But, of
course, Hyman is hardly alone in pinning much of the blame for rising medical costs (in my
view, more of the blame) on providers rather than insurers who fail to control them
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federal government and individual states have bargaining clout exceeding
that of even large companies. Even a small state (e.g., Nevada) has more
employees than even the largest multinational companies. In addition, of
course, insurance administered through a national government or 50 state
administrations would be significantly more streamlined than insurance
purchased through tens of thousands of companies (some large, some
small) and administered by scores of health insurers.
Just as employer-insurer bargaining has not been the anticipated cost
control panacea regarding premiums, bargaining between insurers and
medical providers has not controlled costs to the degree anticipated by
defenders of private medical insurers. It is not at all clear that insurers are
particularly effective at controlling medical costs in a consistent and
rational way.66 In spite of the central role of private insurers in the current
medical care system, medical costs continue to rise, despite some
occasional brief periods of relative stability. By comparison, the health
care systems that stop with the half-measures of the American status quo
and move directly to the government single-payer system have significantly
lower per capita medical costs.
67
The evidence on insurer cost control is mixed. For example, insurers
have been effective in negotiating provider discounts, at least this appears
to be the case on the face of benefits explanation statements commonly sent
by insurers to policyholders. A typical one indicates that Doctor X charged
$85 for an office visit but discounted it to $45 in order to receive insurer
payment. Even with my $20 deductible, Doctor X has, at least in theory,
reduced his charges because of the presence of private insurance in this
medical care transaction.68
(particularly the particularly avaricious) and for often establishing economic incentives that
are at least as misguided as anything the government could dream up; see e.g. Bruce C.
Vladeck, The Political Economy of Medicare, HEALTH AFF., Jan./Feb. 1999, at 22.
66. See Rhonda L. Rundle, Critical Case: How an Email Rant Jolted a Big HMO: A
22-Year-Old's Tirade Made Trouble for Kaiser; Mr. Deal Got Fired, Famous, WALL ST. J.,
Apr. 24, 2007, at A1 (whistleblower notes $1.5 billion annually in alleged waste expenditure
by insurer on misconceived electronic records project); John C. Goodman, Perverse
Incentives in Health Care, WALL ST. J., Apr. 5, 2007 at A13 (noting that Mayo Clinic may
be cheaper than your local hospital).
67. See supra note 18.
68. Random walks through recent family medical bills reflect similarly deep
discounts, at least on paper, for other services. Fore example, one specialist lists a charge of
$220 for a comprehensive new patient visit, but accepts $96.72 from my insurer, "adjusts"
the charges to eliminate $93.28 (effectively eating this portion of the charge and in effect
knocking the $220 charge to $130, leaving $30 as the patient's portion. For an ultrasound
done separately for the examination, the list price is $175, for which the insurance company
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Alternatively, Doctor Y may be unwilling to discount the retail price of
an office building but has patients who prefer Dr. Y or doctors with a
similar practice style and unwillingness to make deep discounts for
insurers. Dr. Y may simply bill the patient for whatever portion of the bill
the insurer does not cover. In effect, this subjects the patients of Dr. Y
(e.g., me) to a 50 percent co-pay, a financial burden I am happy to bear for
relatively lower cost medical needs of this magnitude. I don't shop for a
cheaper doctor or one more willing to make the insurer's proffered discount
because I prefer Dr. Y, who on average spends triple the time with me
during an office visit than my previous family physician and also is willing
to be involved with any hospitalization of patients.
pays $68.54, the doctor absorbs $89.32 and I am billed $17.14. The math looks about right,
but I am not about to verify by taking the time to dig into the fine print of my group policy
nor am I going to call a representative of the TPA that my employer's plan has retained to
process claims. The final tally of $47.85 billed to me (there were some small lab charges as
well) seems reasonable in relation to the $405 retail price listed on the doctor's invoice and
leaves me paying the traditional 20 percent co-pay. So much for the power of patient
consumerism. Because I was seeing the doctor over a relatively acute medical issue (an
infection), bypassing medical care was not an option and, knowing that all doctors of this
specialty generally charge roughly the same rates, I was unlikely to price shop as well. Nor
would I be deterred by the 20 percent co-pay. The deterrence was the time and
inconvenience of seeing the doctor. If I had not been previously told (based on a routine
blood test) that I had an infection (accompanied by considerable symptoms of discomfort), I
would gladly have skipped the trip to the doctor. So much for moral hazard.
A less extreme example of discount billing with reduced monopoly money
character of U.S. medical insurance was reflected in a recent family bill for oral surgery,
specifically the extraction of four wisdom teeth from my older son's mouth. The dentist
charged $1,465 ($285 for general anesthesia, and $295 per tooth. Of this total, the insurer
paid 1,052, I paid $313, and the dentist absorbed $100 in discount.
Again tending to refute the picture of the world painted by market/consumer-
oriented commentators, I was really pretty indifferent to both the doctor's suggested retail
price and the degree to which the insurer extracted pricing concessions, even though this
was not emergency surgery. This was the dentist my son and I wanted to use based on the
experience of his siblings (one with this dentist and another having a less successful wisdom
teeth extraction with another well-regarded dentist in town). I did not think $1,400 was a
particularly high price to pay for all this dental work, which required not only the time and
skill of the oral surgeon but also specific and general staff assistance, considerable fixed
office overhead (e.g., special equipment), and variable costs such as general and local
anesthesia, gauze, surgical thread, etc. My $300 payment seemed more than reasonable,
again paralleling the customary 20 percent co-pay, but I would hardly have blinked if the
figure had been $400 or $500.
See also Hyman & Silver, supra note 61, at 966 (largely positing substantial
efficacy of private insurers in controlling prices but castigating them for not caring
sufficiently about quality of care delivered). See also id. at 981 (noting that medical
malpractice insurance is "rarely risk rated")(footnote omitted).
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According to the market/consumer-oriented approach, I am not enough
of a bargain hunter. In this realm, I am behaving more according to the
professionalism paradigm of medicine than the market competition
paradigm. I value more thorough professional treatment more than a
reduced price tag. Once again, my own experience suggests that much of
the view of patient behavior posited by those promoting the consumer-
oriented approach does not accurately reflect actual patient behavior, at
least for those with means or insurance.
In addition, something about the deep discounts given by providers to
insurers is uncomfortably reminiscent of the property tax statements we all
also receive as homeowners. A typical such statement gives an assessed
value of the home that, even after the post-2005 housing downturn, is
generally substantially lower than the actual current fair market value of the
house. Thus, a tax rate per $1,000 of value that would seem unduly
confiscatory if the home were valued at current market prices becomes a
sufferable tax burden when applied to an artificially low value carried on
the assessor's books.
In similar fashion, the net cost of a medical service may be discounted
only as a matter of cosmetics. If provider discounts are a part of the game
of insurer-provider interaction, the situation evolves to one in which the
provider's list price is intentionally inflated in the knowledge that the
insurer will impose a discount. In order to get his $45 payment from the
medical insurer, Doctor X charges $90 for what would have otherwise been
a $45 charge (or $65 if the patient's co-pay is viewed as a sort of
subsidizing middleman were eliminated from the equation).
My own view is that $90 for a routine office visit to a family doctor is
high enough to border on the excessive, despite the high overhead of
running a doctor's office, if the doctor is applying the business school rule
of thumb that a doctor's "encounter" with the patient should be no more
than seven minutes. Extrapolated, this results in an hourly rate of
compensation for the doctor exceeding $700, a rate comparable with top
partners in commercial law firms, which have high overhead resembling
that of a doctor's office.
However, if the doctor is seeing each patient for 15 minutes on
average, the doctor's gross hourly rate is less than $400 per hour, a rate
comparable to that of top business lawyers in many cities and a higher rate
of pay than found in most occupations. However, the net income to the
doctor from this hour of work will be considerably less, perhaps even a
comparative pittance, depending on the doctor's overhead costs, which may
be substantial, in some part because of expenditures required for dealing
with private and government insurers. Understandably, even the most
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professional of physicians is tempted by the thought of shorter patient
encounters and greater profits. Spending 10 minutes per patient instead of
15 minutes per patient results in a 50 percent increase in gross income (to
$600/hour). But if overhead costs are not too high, doctors can earn quite a
good living and still give each patient on average 15 minutes of their
professional attention.
The case that per-service charges and compensation to medical
providers are on the high side becomes stronger when one examines the
rate of insurer payment for medical procedures, which can involve
thousands or even tens of thousands of dollars for a 45-75 minute surgery.
Much depends on the locality, the procedure, and the insurer. Similarly,
69Medicare reimbursement rates vary widely by state. In spite of the higher
overhead for surgery (as compared to an office providing patient
examination), these compensation structures can make Wall Street lawyers
look cheap. But it may also be the case that the surgery reimbursement
rates are modest in light of the time, skill, training, and overhead required
for performing a procedure. As previously discussed, one can in my city
get wisdom teeth extracted from a highly regarded oral surgeon for a list
price of less than $300 per tooth. Less prestigious dentists in town may
charge as little as $145 per tooth.70  This is not a lot to spend for an
important, one-time medical-dental event designed to minimize or avoid
future problems.7'
Hospital charges are, from my own experience, more problematic.
Hospital charges of $2,000 per day are not uncommon, with much of the
cost of medical care received while staying in a hospital separately billed at
69. See Hyman, Mephistopheles, 60 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1165, supra note 63, at
1179-81.
70. See supra note 68. As some point, too low a price for wisdom tooth extraction
should presumably raise concerns about patient safety. Unless the doctor charging $145 per
tooth simply has an Albert Schweitzer-like preference for lower income, it is more likely
that he has fewer or less experienced office staff, less modem equipment and facilities, and
a business model that requires greater speed in performing the operation and releasing the
patient. All other things being equal, this has to increase the risk of adverse outcomes for
the patient. The dividing line between safe-but-no-frills extraction and unduly risky
extraction is one best made by trained professionals and competent regulators untainted by
undue financial incentives. But at some point, cheaper medical care becomes less safe
medical care. For example, poorly done wisdom tooth extraction can damage nerves, gums,
other teeth or result in undue bleeding and severe infection as well as a painful "dry socket."
71. But the medical cost-legal fee dichotomy breaks down somewhat. For example,
expensive lawyers are generally retained and paid by business entities that deduct the cost
from their taxable income. Individuals only have this luxury if medical expenses exceed 7.5
percent of gross income in a given year.
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a separate time. In spite of the cost of physical overhead, nursing services,
and liability insurance that a stay at the hospital somewhat different than
grabbing a hotel room, this is a lot of money to spend for in essence
parking a patient in a spot with access to medical facilities and nursing care
personnel. If private insurers can force doctors to take 50 percent
discounts, one wonders why similar cost reduction has not been imposed
on hospitals.
Viewed broadly, it appears that private insurers standing in for
individuals undoubtedly restrain medical care costs to a significant degree.
But they are hardly great price-busters in this regard. More important for
purposes of the medical insurance debate, there appears to be no reason that
a government entity policing medical charges could not perform the price
control function as effectively as private insurers. In practice, it appears
that the Veteran's Administration, Medicare, and Medicaid all do
comparably well in this regard as compared to private insurers.
If nothing else, a quilt of private insurance funding much of health care
logically imposes greater expenditures than a government plan simply from
the higher administrative costs associated with documenting services,
claims, and payment involving so many insurers who have different forms,
procedures, and protocols. Typical doctor's offices devote more than half
their overhead simply to the administrative and paperwork burdens
imposed by the current system. In effect, we have a system that acts as
something of a private full-employment measure by requiring the hiring of
several persons who do not actually provide medical services in order to to
support a single person or handful of persons actually offering medical
services. In the private health insurance world, bureaucracy and paperwork
dominate to a degree that few government agencies can match.72 For
72. Again, to me, personal and shared experience is as telling as any statistical report.
As one example, I have a friend with a spouse in need of mental health care. Although her
group insurance policy clearly covers these services, the claims administrator (which was
retained by the managing general agent (which was retained by the self-insured employer's
group insurance plan) has repeatedly, erroneously refused treatment, incorrectly claiming
that the spouse must be in an "acute" ready-to-jump-off-a-bridge mental state. After many
hours of phone calls and emails, my friend finally reached someone in the MGA office who
confirmed that indeed there was coverage under the policy. However, to effectuate
treatment, she is again required to go through the same claims administrator that continues
to claim non-coverage even though this issue has been decided favorably to the insured. It
is hard to imagine a government agency doing a poorer, more wasteful job of determining
coverage and policing the receipt of medical benefits. Cynics among us might wonder
whether this is in fact part of a larger conspiracy (tacit or explicit) to delay treatment and
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hospitals, the ratio or medical to administrative expenses is somewhat
lower, but largely only because the cost of medical services at the hospital
(e.g., surgery, intravenous feeding, intensive care) dwarfs the costs of the
less intense medical care administered in a doctor's office. Further, if one
considers the provision of a basic room and bed to be administrative
overhead rather than medical services, the hospital ratio of overhead to
medical costs would be high. By contrast, government programs offer a
consistency and streamlining superior to that of the current status quo
affecting most insureds.
Reduction of paperwork provides the opportunity to deploy the savings
in administrative costs for most substantive expenditures such as more
useful treatment or better compensation of medical professionals who
payment or to discourage insureds from using mental health services that they literally have
paid for in advance through insurance premiums.
Closer to home is my daughter's experience with physical therapy after knee
surgery. Pursuant to a doctor's prescription (actually several over time), she has been
receiving therapy for some months. Throughout this time, I have received scores of form
letters informing me that my insurer cannot determine whether to pay its portion of the cost
until it receives further information. The insurer claims it does not have the prescription(s)
on file while the provider claims it was sent weeks earlier. Eventually, the provider and the
insurer agree that these indeed are properly covered and documented services, although
there has been for me some lost time from work making calls or writing letters.
For example, as this was being written, I received in the mail a thick envelope
from my insurance plan's claims administrator containing 30 separate forms (plus an
additional two forms arriving under separate cover in the same day's mail) indicating that,
after all the dust had settled , my insurer was covering the physical therapy. I am course
happy to be covered without dispute and to have my daughter receive needed post-operation
physical therapy. But was it even remotely necessary to kill so many trees and incur so
much administrative expense in coming to that decision and communicating it to me?
In effect, the bottom line is the same. But due to these miscommunications and
delays, approximately 70 of my daughter's PT sessions have resulted in insurer-generated
letters and "explanation" of benefits that needlessly kill trees, require postage, distract me,
and require filing. Meanwhile, the provider waits weeks or months for payment, which may
explain part of why the cost for a simple physical therapy session is (at least by my
reckoning) shockingly high (both in stated retail terms and after discount). Of course, the
delay and extra expense may be the provider's fault. But an efficient insurer would
presumably find some way to avoid at least some of this seemingly needless expense.
It is hard to imagine a government single-payer system creating more waste for in
connection with a claim that in the final analysis is covered as part of routine insurer
operations. Nor does the private insurer/claims manager appear to be any better at
communicating than much-maligned government bureaucracies. For example, the typical
letter of this type I have received in connection with my daughter's physical therapy informs
me that this is a "2nd Notice" (even when it is the first notice) and that I must "[pllease
respond in 30 days." A few lines later, I am told that "[n]o action is required of you at this
time."
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might otherwise be unwilling to perform services for the payment rates
promised by private insurers. For example, an increasing number of
physicians will not accept private insurance (or at least certain types of
private insurance) but will accept Medicaid or Medicare patients. In effect,
this portion of the market of medical providers is refuting market-based
defense of the status quo and demonstrating that for doctors there is
nothing inherently superior about dealing with a private insurer as
compared to a government insurer.
Perhaps the biggest elephant in the room for advocates of increase
market-based, privatized, or consumer-driven health care is the simple fact
that the United States long ago stopped resembling anything close to a pure
market-based model for the delivery of medical care.73 In spite of this
"[t]axpayers . ..don't get as much bang for their bucks because the
government guarantees coverage for the elderly and the poor, groups that
account for a disproportionately large amount of expenditures.
74
Most obviously, we have Medicare and Medicaid and the VA and the
Federal Employees Insurance Program as well as the de facto insurance of
emergency room care that, for the uninsured, becomes subsidized or even
"free" medical care, the costs of which are externalized on the medical
community and society at large. This coverage accounts for 40 percent or
more of the medical coverage provided in the country (and perhaps even
more of the total expenditures on health care). Medicare is politically
popular and will as only expand as the population ages. Medicaid, like
most programs designed for the needy, has a less powerful political base
but seemingly also one that can withstand attack. The VA enjoys similar
73. See Daniel Gross, National Health Care? We're Halfway There, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 3, 2006, §3, at 4 (stating that 38 percent of medical expenses in U.S. are publicly
funded; "[t]he government spends money as if there were a national health insurance
program. In 2004, government spending on health care equaled 9.6 percent of the gross
domestic product, compared with 6.9 percent in Canada, which has a single-payer universal
health care program," (quoting Harvard Medical School Professor David Himmelstein);
considering all expenditures "government accounts for about two-thirds of health care
spending" (quoting Princeton University economist Uwe Reinhardt)). Accord, Anna
Bernasek, Health Care Problem? Check the American Psyche, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 2006
§3, at 1 (in U.S., government share of total medical care spending is 45 percent). See also
Bobinski, supra note 13 ("In 1987, the public and private share of health expenditures were
the mirror image of the distribution found in Candada, with the private sector picking up
70% of the costs of health care and the public sector paying for 30%. The public share of
health care expenditures [in the U.S.] grew to 40% in 2005 and remained stable in
2006")(footnotes omitted).
74. See Gross, supra note 73 ("A rough rule holds that private insurance covers two-
thirds of the population and pays for only one-third of all health care"(quoting Reinhardt)).
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support. Although no one likes the use of emergency room visits as a
substitute for regular health care (rather than true, acute emergencies or
medical problems taking place at night or on weekends), political and
social sentiment continues to weigh against giving Hospital ERs the
prerogative to refuse services
In addition, even the supposedly more private and market-oriented half
of American health care is a far cry from ordinary retail selection, purchase
and consumption. Beginning with the use of health insurance coverage as a
means of escaping the strictures of World War II's wage and price controls,
we have replaced individual fee-for-services purchase of medical care with
not just an insurance-based system but one dominated by large group plans
that are only "chosen" by policyholders at the margin. As this system has
evolved, it has become, as well described by Nan Hunter, into "employer
corporate sovereignty in the formulation and administration of risk pools
for group health insurance in the workplace., 75 Although this may be
"private" (in that it is done by employers and non-government group
insurers), it is not so much a market as a negotiated form of private
legislation.
Advocates of greater efficiency in health care pricing and delivery can
muster a number of good arguments against a greater government role and
against government subsidization. But in addition to the problem of
overlooking the humanitarian concern that adequate health care seems to
many of us more a right than a consumer preference, the conservative side
of the health insurance debate founders on empirical shoals. Political
sentiment will almost certainly prevent any retrenchment of the existing
governmental presence in the medical coverage status quo. Only a
minority of voters seem to get enthused when political candidates rail
against socialized medicine and only a few of even those that do have been
willing to support any significant curtailment of the existing systems. Most
voters want to at least maintain the government presents that already exists.
That sentiment will only grow stronger as more voters reach age 65 and the
total medical costs of the Iraq War and Afghanistan intervention continue
to roll on for years to come.
Because of this political reality, conservatives will never again see an
open market world regarding the purchase and delivery of medical services.
Consequently, many of the proposed conservative remedies for current
health care problems are simply not likely to be effective. They cannot
75. See Nan D. Hunter, Risk Governance and Deliberative Democracy in Health
Care, 97 GEO. U. 1 (2008).
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supplant the current mixture of public and private with a tabula rasa that
permits the purported full flowering of benefits they posit from a private
market model. Consequently, they are reduced to proposing incentives for
more efficient behavior or isolated market-mimicking initiatives such as
health savings accounts.
As Tim Jost persuasively argues, HSAs appear largely a government
subsidized benefit to the healthy and wealthy.16 This is hardly the return of
the free, private market. Rather, it looks instead like successful rent-
seeking by interest groups (the wealthy, banks, and insurers selling the
high-deductible catastrophic plans that accompany HSAs). Since the
nation is not overrun with wealthy people in good health looking for tax
shelters and humans are not the posited rational option maximers consumed
with financial planning, the predicted boom in HSAs has been slow to
materialize, suggesting that they are not the panacea painted by their
advocates."
The second empirical shoal upon which the conservative ship founders
is the experience of other industrialized nations. As previously noted,
Canada and Western Europe, after embarking on national government-run
plans for universal coverage, have never retreated from that goal. More
important, as also previously noted, the per capita costs of medical care in
those nations is dramatically lower than the U.S. and their citizenry appears
to be at least as health as that of the U.S.78 Simply put, one must ask the
76. See Jost, supra note 4.
77. See Vanessa Fuhrmans, Health Savings Plans Start to Falter; Despite Employer
Enthusiasm for Consumer-Directed Approach, Patients Express Dissatisfaction With How
the Accounts Work, WALL ST. J., June 12, 2007, at D1.
78. See Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Private or Public Approaches to Insuring the
Uninsured: Lessons From International Experience With Private Insurance, 76 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 419,437-39 (2001) (noting higher costs of U.S. system as compared to those of other
countries); Justin Lahart, Rethinking Health Are and the GDP, WALL ST. J., Jan. 25, 2007, at
CI (noting dramatically higher costs per capita of U.S. System but U.S. measuring worse
according to life expectancy, infant mortality, and other metrics); But see Tyler Cowen,
Abolishing the Middlemen Won't Make Health Care a Free Lunch, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22,
2007, at C3 (contending that full amount of medical overhead costs in Europe and Canada is
systemically understated in cost comparison studies because of failure to consider longer
waiting times for some services in non-U.S. countries, which shifts in-kind overhead cost to
consumer and also arguing that European systems are less responsive to paying for new
treatments and drugs); Froma Harrop, Canada's the Wrong Model for Universal Health
Care, SEATTLE TIMES, Feb. 28, 2007, available at
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/opinion/2003592432_harrop28.html (referring to
study by Fraser Institute, an organization that "promotes privatization" as finding Canadian
system "wanting" in comparison to others but failing to provide concrete examples).
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question: If movement toward greater privatization, market competition, or
personal choice is so wonderful, why have these other nations not moved in
this direction? And why has there failure to make any such movement not
seemingly harmed health care in those countries relative to the more
privatized, market-based, consumer-driven United States?
III. THE INEFFICACY OF INSURERS IN ACHIEVING FAIR
COST CONSTRAINT
Another aspect of Adam Smith's legacy in the U.S. is a widely held
belief that the private sector is always considerably more efficient than the
public sector in accomplishing goals.79 Applied to medical coverage, this
mythology posits that private sector insurers play a vital role in controlling
health care costs that stems from the private sector's greater talent in
achieving efficiency. A significant fear standing in the way of movement
toward government as single payer is that health care costs, already rising
well faster than inflation, will be even less effectively checked by
government than it has been by the private sector.
The mythology of Smithian invisible hand efficiency is so strong that
its advocates conveniently overlook the degree to which much of the
American economy has implicitly found that in many instances,
Both the Harrop and Cowen op-ed pieces reflect the type of rhetorical shortcut
that often substitutes for analysis in the health care debate. Harrop quotes the Fraser Institute
founder saying that "If people don't have to dig into their own pockets when they use
medical services" "you find yourself giving universal access to a physician for sniffles and
company."' Cowen makes a more sophisticated but similar argument that "patients and
doctors will try to get the most out of any system. When they aren't paying directly,
patients will seek extra care and doctors will be happy to oblige.") (also analogizing overuse
of medical services as akin to shoplifting items in a retail store).
This is the standard, overblown moral hazard analysis dumbed down to a homey
phrase. But does it really measure the inclination of more than a micro-majority of
consumers? Every person I know (including non-working adults and students) finds going
to the doctor (even when quite sick) to be a great inconvenience that exacts a heavy price in
time and energy even without a co-pay or deductible. They only go to the doctor when they
feel they have a real need. For sniffles, they would rather have the additional time at work
or to rest at home rather than parking themselves in a doctors' office after breaking up their
day to travel there. On this issue, much of the resistance to comprehensive government-
administered insurance appears to come from those who hold a warped picture of the real
world. Although over-utilization by a fully insured population is a danger at the margin, it
hardly represents normal patient behavior.
79. Bernasek, supra note 60 ("[c]hanging the minds of so many millions of people
isn't done overnight. But sooner or later, persuading people to do something that's in their
own economic interest ought to succeed.").
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government regulation in derogation of private markets has been necessary
for sound and efficient economic and social policy. Occasionally, even
government operation of certain activities may be more efficient than
regulated or unfettered market activity. For example, we have largely
forsaken the invisible hand in the cases of utility provision (gas, electricity,
water), transportation (roads and mass transit), airports, cargo hauling,
military procurement, and infrastructure generally.
One can view the provision of adequate health care as an infrastructure
problem. Like many such problems, it is best solved by government
intervention (and funding) to create the infrastructure platform, which in
turn decreases administrative costs, provides consistency, and increases
social productivity. Efforts initially perhaps seen as in derogation of
Smith's invisible hand thus ultimately help create an environment in which
markets and productivity can flourish beyond what would occur in the
absence of adequate infrastructure.
This portion of the health insurance problem also reflects another legal
friction or inconsistency in attitudes. On the one hand, the public wants to
hold down health care cost increases. But on the metaphorical other hand,
the public appears unwilling to embrace many cost-containing measures.
For example, health costs during the 1990s were relatively stable but this
appears to have resulted in significant part from the limitations on care
imposed by HMOs. Many insureds chafed at these restrictions and their
discontent fueled policy measures restricting HMO gatekeeping or
mandating benefits. Although the reining in of HMOs may not have been
the sole or even prime cause, health care costs began to rise again
significantly in the late 1990s and early 20th Century.
Critics of a national medical insurance plan have at least something of
a point: if left to their own devices, consumers will take and take and take
when it comes to medical care, at least if they are not paying sufficiently
directly with their own money. Consequently, they argue, under a
government funded and administered system, individuals will lack
adequate incentive to control themselves and will consistently opt for more
treatment when less would suffice. Hydraulically, this drives up the cost of
health care (quite substantially in the aggregate) unless it is tamped down
by a gatekeeper.
Defenders of the current model argue that the private insurance
industry does this better than government. Although some of the "proof'
for this assertion is essentially a second bare assertion that government is
always more wasteful than the private sector, defenders to the status quo
can point to government reaction to HMO controls as an example of the
government's greater sensitivity toward consumer sentiment. Insurers
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argue, at least implicitly, that his is bad because it gives government
insufficient backbone to control health care costs, by rationing if necessary
and that by contrast the insurance industry, fueled by the profit motive of
Smith's invisible hand, has the fortitude to hold the line on costs (or at least
hold the line better than the government).
This is not an unpersuasive or illogical argument. However, it ignores
two substantial problems. First, advocates of holding the line on costs
appear not to recognize that holding the line is not always a good thing.
Sometimes, some things are worth a higher price in order to better provide
the good or service in question. Sometimes this is for utilitarian reasons:
doing something right will increase productivity further down the line.
Sometimes, this is for humanitarian reasons: doing something right is
worth simply to provide better, more humane treatment to patients.
Government regulation banning "drive-by" deliveries of babies (so
named because insurers would not pay for more than 48 hours of hospital
care after a delivery, and hospitals tended to seek discharge within 48 hours
even if individuals were willing to pay for longer stays) provides a good
example. In his previous writings, David Hyman has attacked these
regulations with a sustained ferocity usually reserved for Red Sox fans
talking about the Yankees. 0 In his contribution to this Symposium, he
again makes the argument that these regulations needlessly increased
hospital stays and medical costs, resulting in a corresponding increase in
medical insurance that encouraged shrinkage of coverage.81
I have quite a different view, one formed in large part as a result of my
wife's experience with three baby deliveries, all by Caesarian section.
Although Hyman would undoubtedly criticize this as argument by
anecdote, I think the points made by reciting my own family experience
make a useful point. Further, although policymaking that is too driven by
anecdote of course is dangerous, it is equally dangerous to lose sight of the
application of policies by paying insufficient attention to personal
experience and giving exclusive focus to aggregate date that may obscure
or minimize the consequences of practices on the ground. Josef Stalin was
not addressing medical insurance when he infamously uttered that "a single
death is a tragedy; a million deaths is a statistic." But he could just as well
have been. It may be a mistake to legislate on the basis of a single moving
80. See David A. Hyman, Commentary, What Lessons Should We Learn from Drive-
Through Deliveries? 107 PEDIATRICS 406 (2001); Hyman, Drive-Through Deliveries, supra
note 61.
81. See Hyman, Government Failure?, supra note 4.
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personal story. But it can be just as mistaken to legislate (or refrain from
legislation) based on aggregate data that glosses over the daily operation of
medical care and insurance for real people.
My story (or rather, my wife's) is not tragic and moving in the manner
of a patient's needless death due to malpractice or lack of even achieving
patient status because of lack of insurance, but it is instructive. When our
first child was born, there was a long, difficult delivery in which, after 20
hours of labor, the medical professionals concluded (about 12 hours too
late for my taste, but that was the orientation of this practice) that Caesarian
section was necessary for a safe birth. Surgery successfully occurred in the
wee hours of the morning and a healthy baby emerged. Mom was
exhausted, looking and feeling a bit like someone who had been in a
marthon boxing match.
Nonetheless, the hospital gave us the bum's rush out after a two-day
stay in the hospital.82 We were comparatively young, unsophisticated in
these matters, and probably should have fought harder to stay in the
hospital for two days (perhaps more) of much needed rest and care. I even
made an attempt at offering to pick up the extra care out of personal funds.
The hospital was distinctly uninterested in working with us. If the
insurance would not pay for more than 48 hours of post-op care, it
seemingly wanted us out, in spite of our middle class ability to pay. So
much for consumer-driven health care.
Back home, the consequences of a rushed, abbreviated stay in the
hospital were palpable. The new mother, still physically exhausted from
delivery, was now attempting to recover from the wounds of a C-section at
home while caring for a newborn. Although the dutiful husband did his
semi-competent best to manage care for baby and mother, this was a far cry
from the type of rest and care both would have received from the hospital.
It took weeks for my wife to recover sufficiently to do anything of modest
strenuousness. Anecdotal or not, I remain convinced that she would have
returned to her normal energy, health, productivity much sooner if she
could have only had a few more days in the hospital.
82. Which means that we were accorded less coverage (and less maternal recovery
time in the hospital) than even if we had been subject to a standard "drive-through delivery,"
which Hyman defines as the practice of discharging women and newborns from the hospital
less than forty-eight hours after a vaginal delivery and ninety-six hours after a Cesarean
section. See Hyman, Drive-Through Deliveries, supra note 69, at 9. Consequently, our
family medical insurance situation would have been helped significantly with legislation
that did not go as far as the Newborns and Mothers' Health Protection Act of 1996. 42
U.S.C. § 300gg-4 (2003).
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In addition, the newborn in question (our elder son) at age three weeks
developed a viral infection, exhibited meningitis-like symptoms, and was
hospitalized and given considerable medical care for days before
recovering, which of necessity took mom and dad further away from work
and productivity. Although proving a link between my son's severe
problems at age three weeks and the shortened hospital stay is impossible, I
can't help but think that his mother's bedraggled condition on discharge,
which made for lactation and nursing problems, which in turn posed
nutrition and immunity issues for the baby, might have played a role. In
any event, what resulted was a 4-5 week period in which two previously
productive adults were largely out of commission in at least some part due
to the supposedly cost-saving, efficient mechanism of kicking new mothers
to the curb two days after a particularly rough delivery and C-section birth.
When subsequent children arrived, C-section was also required. By
then, we were a little more sophisticated and assertive (and had broader
insurance coverage and better medical care). In addition to performing the
operations much earlier without physically punishing the mother for hours,
additional hospital recovery time was obtained. Maternal recovery and
new baby care proceeded far more smoothly and effectively. Neither of the
children had any post-partum health problems and both Mom and Dad got
considerably more done during the ensuing five weeks after these
deliveries than was the case with the first delivery.
With this personal history, it is understandable that I was never a fan of
drive-by deliveries and was thrilled to see government intervention to stop
them. Notwithstanding Hyman's cogent (if perhaps overheated) arguments
of net policy detriment, I remain a fan of this regulation. Although it will
not always result in greater family productivity and reduced overall
medical costs, I am convinced that in many cases giving a new mother and
baby a couple more days of hospital care (while the often hapless husband
also has more time to get the home situation under control) will have that
effect. More important, it is simply a more humane way to treat new
mothers and children. American society regularly purports to value
families. Providing an additional increment of medical care - or at least
removing the incentive for hospitals to rush patients home - is a small price
to pay in the service of those values.
A second problem with the conventional wisdom (that the private
sector controls costs much better than the government) is that considerable
evidence exists to suggest the sentiment is overblown or perhaps even
erroneous. At the least, it appears that private insurers do an inconsistent
job of holding the line. More important, it is to me unclear whether private
insurers do any better job of cost containment than does the government.
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Alternatively, if private insurers do too much better than the government in
holding down the price of medical services, this may create incentives that
undermine the availability and provision of sound medical care.
As previously noted, private insurers have been able to extract from
medical providers significant discounts from what the provider otherwise
states as the "list price" for a medical or laboratory service. This may
simply mean that medical pricing has become like automobile shopping.
The "sticker price" exists only as an outside anchor or measuring stick but
no one really pays this list price (except the rare uninsured patient who
actually has independent financial resources). For purposes of argument, I
will give credit to insurers for actually enforcing some type of real price
constraint about medical providers. At the very least, one certainly hears
doctors consistently complain about the low payment rates provided by
83insurers.
The question then becomes: does the private insurer do a better job of
payment-for-services containment than comparable government programs.
Here, the evidence seems mixed. Insurers may be doing a pretty good job
of keeping doctors from charging exorbitant amounts (even if they are also
encouraging doctors to provide assembly-line care). But Medicare and
Medicaid also appear to be effective in tamping down costs-per-medical
service. And the VA, with its system of staff physicians on salary, may be
the most efficient of all in controlling doctor-related costs. Even where the
insurer suppresses provider rates more than does a government payer, this
hardly means the net benefit to patients and society is greater. Excessive
cost cutting may lead to unwanted collateral consequences.
84
83. Doctors also differentiate among insurers. Many refuse to see patients insured by
carriers whose payment rates are simply too low. One former internist of mine explained he
rejected patients covered by the HMO then known as US Healthcare because it paid "coolie
wages" for office visits. Whatever the political incorrectness of the comment, it is a pretty
good reflection of the way many doctors today do business. They will work with some
health insurers but not others based on the amounts paid for service, the administrative
burden, and the overall difficulty of working with some providers. Other physicians may
take an "all comers" attitude, assuming that by seeing enough patients fast enough, they can
make more money than if they simply avoid the stingiest, most difficult insurers altogether.
84. The same, of course, can be true for excessive imposition of costs. See Stephen
Dubner & Steven D. Levitt, Unintended Consequences, The Case of the Red-Cockaded
Woodpecker, N.Y. TIMES, Jan 20, 2008 (Magazine) available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/20/magazine/20wwln-freak-t.html?-r= 1 &oref=-slogin.
Dubner & Levitt, in an installment of their now well-known "Freakonomics"
feature in the Times (see also STEPHEN DUBNER & STEVEN D. LEVITY, FREAKoNoMIcs:A
ROGUE ECONOMIST EXPLORES THE HIDDEN SIDE OF EVERYTHING (William Morrow 2005)),
give the example of a deaf patient consulting an orthopedic surgeon and insisting on her
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Clearly there is inherent tension (legal friction once again) between the
goal of making provision of quality medical services economically
attractive to prospective providers and holding back runaway medial costs.
Hyman's resolution of the tension is largely against medical providers and
in favor of insurers and the posited cost-controlling force of more
empowered consumers. In addition to disagreeing with Hyman about the
actual efficacy of consumer constraint, particularly where the consumer is
too poor or uninsured to have much clout, I question whether excessive
payment to providers, particularly doctors, is the culprit.
Consider my eye doctor, who in addition to being very competent is
also professional in the classic sense. Although he is repeatedly identified
as one of the best doctors in the area in local magazine's "best of' features,
he carries a comparatively low patient load, spends significant time with
each patient, and has an uncrowded waiting room. He accepts Medicare
but not many private insurers, where he not only has found the
reimbursement rate too low but also has found the private insurers'
paperwork and bureaucratic hassle to be too much for his staff. He also
expresses support for a comprehensive single-payer system along the lines
of Medicare and suspects that a large portion of doctors, particularly
younger doctors less reared on the traditional AMA stances against
"socialized" medicine, agree with him.
right (per the Americans With Disabilities Act) to a sign language interpreter so that she
could better understand the doctor's diagnosis and recommendation. In the Los Angeles
metro area where this took place, a qualified interpreter generally charges $120/hour with a
two-hour minimum, an amount required to be bome by the physician and which the
patient's private health insurer refused to cover. Not surprisingly, the good doctor who
initially accepted this needy patient and then was hit with unexpected interpreter charges
made no money on this patient. His solution and that of similarly situated doctors in the
future will be to attempt to avoid taking such patients. Id.
The episode serves of course as a good example of the occasional incidence of
negative unintended consequences from well-meaning legislation. In addition, it serves to
illustrate the degree to which too much of the modem health care burden has been placed on
doctors relative to insurers. Further, it provides additional support for a government single
payer system. Imposing translator costs on a single doctor, or even a medical group or
hospital, has great potential for unfairness simply because of the fortuity of when a deaf
prospective patient may approach a particularly provider seeking medical care. Imposing
mandatory coverage on a single private insurer is a better approach but still may result in
lopsided distribution of the added costs of improving the access and experience of the deaf
seeking medical care. But if the coverage is provided by a national government single payer
system, the added costs of translation are spread as broadly as possible and amortized
among many beneficiaries of the medical-economic system. This optimal risk spreading
seems the fairest solution as well as one efficient in administrative terms and unlikely to
deter any particular deaf patient from seeking and receiving desired care.
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Regarding costs: when he first began performing cataract surgery, he
reports that the Medicare reimbursement rate was approximately $1,200
and that of private insurers was about $1,100. Notwithstanding the
aggregate data about overall increase in medical costs, he has seen the rate
of payment for cataract surgery go down (at least in Las Vegas) to a current
rough range of $600 - $900, depending on the insurer. Medicare pays
about $750. In a world where a visit from the plumber or electrician
routinely results in minimum bills of $125 or more, this hardly seems like
excessive compensation for the doctor. Purchase of cataract surgery
logically should cover not only the doctor's actual time and skill in
performing the procedure but must provide reasonable contribution to
defraying his overhead and recoupment of investment in human capital
such as medical school and additional training and education.
Successful cataract surgery of course dramatically improves the
patient's vision and quality of life and probably improves their economic
productivity as well (even though many cataract patients are older and
retired). Compared to other expenditures, particularly those for personal
services,85 paying $750 to the doctor for the procedure does not seem like
price gouging or an otherwise bad deal. More important, if high quality
physicians are reluctant to discount their prices below this amount, trouble
can ensue. Perhaps less competent doctors will be the ones performing the
$600 cataract surgeries. Or perhaps the doctor will make sure he takes on
additional patients and schedules an additional procedure or two on surgery
days, even if this results in more error due to haste or mistakes born of
tiredness.
85. Economies of scale are easier to achieve with manufactured goods than with
delivery of even relatively routine personal services. For example, once the mold has been
established, a manufacturer can crank out I-pods or televisions at a lower cost per additional
unit than even the most rushed, robotic surgeon. Personal services of necessity require
investment of at least a minimum amount of time and present individual variants not found
in manufacturing. Every defective plumbing joint or electric socket is a bit different while
mass-produced goods are not. As a result, an I-pod that lasts for years can be sold for $300
but the same amount of medical care quickly disappears into the mists of consumer
memory. As a result, people tend to see services as overprice relative to hard goods.
Hence, the problem faced by family doctors, pediatricians, dermatologists, and other doctors
whose primary work is seeing patients. By contrast, surgeons and doctors performing
diagnostic procedures are better compensated per minute of their time. Surgical procedures
are a bit of a hybrid in that something like successful cataract removal is a one-time event
with long-lasting, positive consequences. Prescription drugs have elements of both
manufacturing (although research and development costs may be high and harder to recoup
than found for consumer goods) and ongoing personal service because one needs in many
cases to continue purchasing and using the pharmaceutical product for years on end.
[Vol. 14:2
HeinOnline -- 14 Conn. Ins. L.J. 282 2007-2008
ADAM, MARTIN AND JOHN
Ultimately, these are empirical questions. My point is that there is
nothing to suggest that Medicare has resolved them less well than a more
tight-fisted insurer. Although government programs might be more
vulnerable to inflationary pressures stemming from politics and public
opinion, private insurers are similarly vulnerable to excessive deference to
the profit motive. If I were having cataract surgery (or most any other
medical procedure), I would rather have the decisionmakers err on the side
of pricing and policies that will make skill service and good treatment
outcomes more likely. This of course may make for higher per service
costs under a government single-payer program. But administrative cost
savings may make up the difference and certainly appear to do so in
Canada and Europe. To the extent that they do not fully do so, this may
simply be the price paid to medical providers by a wealthy nation for high
quality health care that produces collateral economic and social benefits.
In other areas of medical costs, it is similarly hard so see private
insurers doing particularly better than government insurers regarding cost
control. Consider the matter of hospital costs. Again, personal experience
drives my thinking along with aggregate data. In January 2006, I was
stricken with a severe infection, high (105 degrees Fahrenheit) fever,
substantial body aches and pain and a tennis-ball sized cyst on my liver.
After this was detected in an MRI, I was instructed by my doctor to get into
the nearest hospital for further care, which consisted primarily of
intravenous antibiotics. The IV antibiotics worked wonders. Within 36
hours, my fever had abated and I was considered out of danger, although
still feeling weak, horrible, achy, etc. The infectious disease specialist
prescribed a six-week regime of continued IV drugs followed by weeks of
orally taken antibiotics. Eventually (but probably not fast enough), I began
self-administering my IV antibiotics at home with "picc" line in my arm.
The draining of the liver cyst presented more complex and
confrontational issues. At the hospital, it was quickly agreed that the cyst
should be drained. The staff radiologist felt it was too dangerous to do this
without surgery, which the general surgeon was only too happy to perform,
although this would have necessitated a long (6-8 week) recovery period
from the invasive surgery alone. On the good advice of doctor friends, we
located another radiologist who reviewed the CT scan and X-ray film and
concluded that the cyst could be safely drained with the less invasive
insertion of a needle, preferably as an outpatient proceeding but possibly
requiring post-op hospitalization depending on the results. It took days of
wrangling to get discharged from the first hospital. Drainage at the second
hospital (where the second radiologist had privileges) went well but the
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condition of the withdrawn cyst material prompted the doctor to require
hospitalization because of fears of internal bleeding.
All this happened on the Friday before the 2006 Martin Luther King
holiday weekend, which meant that getting physician follow-up was
difficult. Finally, by the ensuing Wednesday, I was discharged. The
situation was made more difficult because my former primary care
physician did not visit patients in the hospital. Instead, the overall
supervision of my care fell to the "hospitalists" or general care internists
that contracted with the hospital. During both my hospital stays (10 days
total), the hospitalists spent a total of about 15 minutes with me (or which
they billed more than $750, a rate that most would agree is unconscionably
high for doctors with this level of skill and comparatively little overhead as
compared to "regular" doctors maintaining an office). During those 15
minutes, they (four different doctors for the hospitalist group were
involved) misstated my record on several occasions. Fortunately, I was
conscious and could correct them. They also were slow to discharge me,
first for the drainage of the cyst and second for home IV care.
During our cumulative 15 minutes together, they asked probing
questions such as whether I raised goats in the back yard and whether that
might be a source of the infection. I successfully suppressed the urge to
remind the doctor in question (a non-native graduated from a non-U.S.
medical school) that we were in Las Vegas, not Waziristan. Subsequently,
I switched to a primary care physician who would (a) visit me in the
hospital to make sure my care was appropriate and (b) did not have an
economic incentive with his hospital client to keep me in the hospital
longer than necessary (a goal that Wayne, Smith and King would
presumably support).
Finally, some weeks after this experience, I received communication
from the hospital and other care providers (although, perhaps
unsurprisingly, the hospitalists lagged, not billing for the services until
more than a year later, without having submitted the bill to my insurer,
even though I had provided them insurance information upon admission to
the hospital). My insurer (or rather the claims administrator that contracts
with the State of Nevada's self-insured plan) was reasonable.86
86. Our biggest imbroglio was that it did not want to pay for the second
hospitalization because it had not been pre-cleared. In response to the insurer's original
denial, I explained that the original treatment plan was to perform cyst drainage on an out-
patient basis and forgo hospitalization but that, reacting to what he saw during the
procedure, the radiologist, a senior, well-respected doctor in town, required hospitalization
as a precaution out of concern over possible post-drainage internal bleeding. (I suspect he
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When the final bills rolled in, they were substantial, although having
survived, I was more than happy to pay my 20 percent co-pay and move on
with life (which, in clichd-like fashion, I appreciated all the more after this
series of misadventures in the medical system). What continues to bug me,
however, is that there seemed to be lots of fat in this system that could have
been much better controlled by non-avaricious medical professionals and a
more enlightened private insurer/claims management company.
First, there is the absolute cost of hospitalization. It averaged about
$2,000 a day. I realize there is a lot of overhead required for a hospital, but
this seems just too much for ordinary, brand-x rooms and nursing care. As
in many cities, nursing staffs are stretched thin. There were typically only
four nurses on the floor and, judging from my regular sojourns around the
floor, they had many patients in far worse shape than me. They also spent
a considerable amount of their time in record-keeping, even to the neglect
of patients buzzing for assistance. I was ambulatory within a day or so of
the first admission, another sign that it might have been appropriate to have
both hospital stays shortened. (But it was a major boon to be able to walk
to the juice cooler with my IV tower in tow because waiting for the nurses
resembled waiting for Godot.)
Two thousand dollars a day for basic hospitalization? In most cities,
one can get a suite at the Ritz for about a third of that amount. And,
presumably, one could purchase a considerable amount of private nursing
care and rented medical equipment for the other half. Part of the problem,
of course, is that patients like me are not in much of a position to shop
among hospitals, compare prices, and make price-conscious decisions.
Residents of rural areas have even less opportunity for comparison
shopping--another problem with the consumer-driven mythology. Even for
elective surgery, one finds relatively little difference in cost when shopping
around (which I did some years before in connection with a hip
replacement), assuming one can get a hospital or doctor's business office to
provide straight answers to questions about costs (reticence I suspect comes
from difficulty in talking about their stated rates and discounted rates paid
by insurers). Under these circumstances, one might hope that insurers
could drive a harder bargain with hospitals. In addition, one must again ask
the comparative question: Are the rates paid by private insurers committed
to quality care significantly less than those paid by government programs?
would not have kept me in the hospital as long as the hospitalists and the hospital, who had
an economic interest in my continued stay, did). So informed, my insurer agreed the
hospitalization was apt.
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If not, much of the efficiency-based argument for continuing to cling to a
private insurance model losses its steam.
If nothing else, private insurers (at least judging from my experience)
have not done much to control adverse financial incentives of medical
providers. In fact, one might argue to the contrary. Once the hospitals
discovered that I had good insurance, they wanted to keep me as long as
possible. The hospitalist physicians, when they could be found at all, were
distinctly unhelpful in trying to speed my release even after it became clear
that further hospitalization was not required. The hospitalists also wanted
more and repetitive tests. (I was CT-scanned twice in three days and had to
figuratively stomp my feet in refusing to have a third before getting out of
the first hospital after a five-day stay). The hospitalists and a general
surgeon practicing at the first hospital were only too eager to subject me to
major abdominal surgery without even exploring the possibility that
perhaps my liver cyst could be drained by needle after all. In the end, I had
a feeling akin to a tourist on a desert island with one vendor, who wanted to
exploit this market advantage for all it was worth until the ship to shore
arrived.
My question: why do insurers, who supposedly want to control
runaway costs, not do more to forbid these adverse incentives (more on that
below regarding problematic professionalism) or police them more
aggressively? In my experience, the only real check on price gouging
through churning of services and an excessively extended stay was the
professionalism of some of medical personnel involved87 and my own
nagging (aided by my family), which avoided more expensive surgery and
finally got me released from the two hospitals.
Of course, this latter factor suggests that market cheerleaders are on to
something in wanting to empower consumers. They simply fail to
appreciate the practical limitations on even educated consumers and seem
to forget that the uninsured patient of modest means have almost no
leverage over anything relating to medicine. Perhaps most important, they
87. For example, the invasive radiologist, the infectious disease specialist, the hospital
nursing staff, and the insurance administrator's case manager were all supportive of an
earlier discharge and transitioning to less expensive outpatient home care as soon as
possible but were delayed by the slowness or mixed motives of the hospitalists. In addition,
my efforts to obtain better, safer, less expensive treatment were aided by doctor friends in
the local medical community, even though they were not my treating physicians. An
impoverished, working class, uninsured, or less educated person would be less likely to
know a helpful doctor through social connections.
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fail to realize the practical limits on my degree of empowerment as a
consumer, at least in this manner with some concrete potential for reducing
medical costs, is no less if I am covered under Medicare or a government
single-payer program rather than a private insurer.
During my time in hospital purgatory, there were other examples of the
insurer being relatively lax in cost control. Consider prescription drugs that
I regularly take. Once admitted to the hospital, I was forbidden to bring my
regular "stash" of pharmaceuticals, which includes cholesterol, blood
pressure, and anti-gout medicine. Instead, the hospital insisted on
administering these prescriptions to me from its stock - at a cost of about
$20 per pill (as compared to the regular cost of about a dollar per dose). I
realize that there can be problems with patients self-medicating. But this
hardly seems to justify a system in which hospitals (who probably get the
drugs for less than I would "on the outside") are permitted to impose a
2000 percent markup in price - willingly paid by the insurer that is
supposed to be such a stringent guardian of costs.
When I was finally liberated from the hospitals, I was visited by a
wonderfully competent, straight-to-the-point home care nurse who
instructed me in self-administration of the antibiotics and then peacefully
left without looking for any other ways to run up costs (although she was
helpfully available by phone for questions and her company replenished
supplies as necessary). Notwithstanding that this part of my treatment was
sensibly streamlined, the costs for the lV equipment and drugs was
significant, approximately $500 per week. Although this is a lot less than
the $2,000 per day at the hospital (plus itemized charges, including the IV
drugs received at the hospital), it still seems high. I realize that drug
manufacturers need to recoup the cost of research and development as well
as continuing overhead and distribution costs. But I was receiving Zocyn,
a common antibiotic that has been in use for years. One might reasonably
expect a truly efficient private medical and insurance system to be able to
get the costs of such at-home drug care down to something like $200 per
week.
All in all, then, my medical experiences of early 2006 strongly
suggested that the medical community and private insurance does a quite
imperfect job in both treating patients and containing costs. During the
course of 10 days in two hospitals and three months of treatment (including
visits to other specialists recommended in light of possible wear-and-tear
on my liver and kidneys from all this), I was treated by a couple physicians
I came to see as highly competent, with a fairly wide range of empathy and
willingness to explain things to the patient. Overall, my condition was
treated appropriately and successfully, but not very efficiently. However,
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some of the medical professionals cut a less positive figure. The hospitalist
physicians were worse than worthless from my patient's perspective.
Ironically, this business model of medicine is touted in many quarters as a
more efficient way to deliver services. The primary family physician can
remain in her suburban office park and see more patients more often while
the hospitalist can efficiently attend to the needs of the hospitalized
patients. My experience suggests this theory is seriously flawed.88
To the extent that the private insurer involved attempted to control
costs, it was with fairly crude all-or-nothing measures rather than targeted
attempts to prevent churning or inflated prices. For example, my insurer
initially balked at my second hospitalization before accepting that it was
medically necessary.89 But it readily paid for $20 pills, multiple expensive
tests, fairly expensive IV drugs, and hospital rooms at Helmsley Palace
prices. Could, Medicare and Medicaid really be worse in this regard, as
Hyman argues? If not, there is no reason to fear a national single payer
system on efficiency grounds. The question is not how government
programs compare with perfection. The question is how government
programs compare to their private insurer counterparts.
More to the point of this Symposium: many aspects of medical
treatment and coverage today are intrinsically removed from the consumer.
In my case, I perhaps could have shopped better for a hospital with lower
rates, a more daring or accomplished resident radiologist, or better
hospitalist physicians. But I was running a 105 degree fever at the time and
my primary care physician was counseling immediate hospitalization and
treatment of a rather large liver cyst. Under those circumstances,
comparison shopping and shrewd consumerism is unlikely.
Of course, not all medical situations are acute or time-sensitive. But
even garden variety routine medical care is reasonably esoteric and has
some temporal imperative that prevents consumer choice. If a five-year old
has a fever and joint aches, this is probably just the flu. But what parent
other than Joan Crawford9" will delay treatment while calling doctors for a
88. I have since switched to a primary physician who will visit hospitalized patients
and serve as a check on the quality and expense of care provided by the hospitals and their
associated vendors. What continues to astound me is the popularity of a professional and
business model so rife with conflicts of interest and incentives for more bureaucratic,
expensive, lower quality care.
89. See supra note 86.
90. The parental shortcomings of Crawford, a popular actress in the 1940s and 1950s,
were extensively chronicled in her daughter's memoir. See CHRISTINA CRAWFORD, MOMMIE
DEAREST (William Morrow 1978).
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price quote? In addition, there are practical problems that likely limit
aggressive consumer cherry picking. What doctor will accept episodic
patients who come to her for flu symptoms, go elsewhere for earache, and
try a third doctor for annual checkups because of lower prices? Even if
doctors had no problem being commodified in this manner, there would
likely be a rise in both the logistical costs of coordinating care and the
substantive quality of care. My experience in the hospital suggested that
doctors seeing patients episodically are overly dependent on patient charts,
which may be inaccurate or misread.
For elective surgery, comparison shopping is equally or more difficult.
Patients can get information, but it is not easy or cost free (all of this takes
time, usually from working parents who lose productivity from this process
as well as the need to nurse a sick family member or themselves back to
health after medical care). Costs will be roughly the same, since they are
driven more by the status quo of government and employer corporate
sovereignty more than any kind of market for services. Even if HSAs and
other consumer-driven initiatives catch on, this will remain the case. In the
real world, away from the drawing boards of the CATO institute and
similar market-utopian think tanks, consumers are not in much of a position
to improve health care or medical coverage.
III. PROBLEMATIC PROFESSIONALISM
Veneration of the private sector (Smith) also supports the traditional
prestige of physicians. In a less well-know segment of the Wealth of
Nations, Smith argued that professionals entrusted with important social
functions, such as doctors (and lawyers, of course) should be well-
compensated so that they had adequate incentive to provide thorough and
competent care. 91 In addition, although Smith did not specifically make
this point, professionals under economic pressure can too often behave in
distinctly unprofessional or sub-professional ways. The current system has
managed to put such pressure on medical providers, particularly doctors,
but at the same time has not provided universal care or adequate
supervision of professional error.
Doctors are perhaps no longer placed on a pedestal or idolized or
iconographic in the manner of the 1970s television series Marcus Welby.
But they enjoy at least the ordinary prestige and deference accorded
successful businesspersons (a legacy of Smith and Wayne) and in addition
91. See SMITH, supra note 6, at 111.
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continued to be venerated for their assistance to patients in time of need.
Other professionals (e.g., lawyers, accountants, architects, engineers) can
only dream of enjoying the prestige and public good will held by doctors.
As a result, the public is resistant to any medical coverage solution that
even appears to reduce patient access to doctors of choice or to restrict the
physician's professional discretion.
The problem with this aspect of modern medical insurance mythology
is the public does not realize the degree to which doctor discretion and
professionalism has already been severely compromised by the private
sector and overall economic factors. Although the worst excesses from the
era of HMO hegemony (e.g., "drive-by" maternity delivery) have been
curbed, private insurers still have a great deal to say about the manner in
which most doctors practice medicine.
In addition, even where an insurer is not directly choreographing the
physician's treatment of a patient, other incentives of the current structure
give rise to a situation in which we now have what I term "problematic
professionalism." Although most doctors continue to perform acceptably
well under adverse circumstances, medical care remains sub-optimal in
spite of its costs due to twisted incentive structures.
Although the health care quilt is a mixture of public and private, for-
profit insurers and their agents (e.g., claims administrators) have a central
role in determining the quantity and quality of care received. Employers,
particularly large employers, of course, have some leverage as purchasers
of group insurance in that insurers will want to accommodate them for
business reasons, particularly if the employer is willing to pay a sufficiently
higher premium in return for desired coverage in a group policy.
Employers thus play a key role to the extent they negotiate with insurers
over the parameters of coverage.
But insurers appear to be the real 800-hundred pound gorillas of this
process in that they design the basic menu of standardized medical
insurance options, shape the parameters of negotiation, and largely have the
final say over the contours of coverage. 92 To a large degree in the U.S. the
private insurance industry sets the parameters of compensation, treatment
with as much practical force as any government (although Medicare as the
largest insurer is also important). Although really large employers may
92. Once again, I differ with Hyman, who contends that Medicare is the "real" 800-
pound gorilla in the health care jungle. See Hyman, supra note 63, at 1166 ("Medicare is
the 800 pound gorilla of American health policy."). But see Hunter, , supra note 75
(employers and insurers in tandem are figurative king of health care beast).
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self-fund their insurance program by collecting funds that in theory will be
adequate for the number of predicted claims, they also typically delegate
policy and claims administration to an MGA or TPA that effectively
operates as an insurer. Employers also typically purchase stop-loss
insurance from a private carrier as well in order to spread the risk assumed
by self-funding.
When the metaphorical dust settles, the insurance industry in effect
operates as a private administrative agency regulating medical insurance
coverage and delivery of medical services. Doctors can avoid this
governance by insurance only if they are willing to forgo accepting
patients' insurance or membership in an insurer HMO or network of
preferred providers. And once participating in a PPO or HMO, the doctor
must do it the insurer's way in order to remain in good standing and in
order for services to the patient to be covered. The law to some extent
gives insurers a further leg up by exempting them from antitrust law
(subject to some limitations) per the McCarran-Ferguson Act93 while
doctors remain subject to antitrust law and are forbidden from concerted
action in restraint of trade.
Doctors are now more than ever acting as small (or in the case of some
large practice groups medium) sized businessmen, placing greater emphasis
on cost control, customer volume, marketing, and reduction of costs in
delivering services.94 This can adversely affect the quality of care simply
93. See 15 U.S.C. § 1011 (2000).
94. For clarification: I am not discussing medical practice law and reform, which is
beyond the scope of this article and most likely asserts only a modest direct impact on
overall health costs, notwithstanding claims of cost-escalating defensive medicine and
undue transaction costs spend on frivolous claims. See, e.g., Martha Raffaele, Study:
Malpractice Crisis had Little Effect on Pa. Doctor Supply, INS. J., April 27, 2007, available
at www.insurancejounral.com/news/east/2007/04/27/79016.htm; Jennifer Robison, The
doctor is out -for good: Some LV physicians can't afford to stay in medicine, LAS VEGA
REv. J., Mar. 25, 2007; Alicia Change, Study: Four Out of 1O Medical Malpractice Cases
are Groundless, INS. J., May 11, 2006, available at
www.insurancejoumal.com/news/national/2006/05/11/68248.htm; Study Says Wrong-Site
Surgery Is Very Rare and Preventable, INS. J., April 17, 2006, available at
www.insurancejoumal.com/news/national/2006/04/17/67367.htrn. See also Silver &
Hyman, supra note 61; Atul Gawande, The Checklist, NEW YORKER, Dec. 10, 2007, 86
(noting degree to which relatively simple intensive care protocols can effectively improve
patient odds of survival but medical community slowness in adopting such protocols: "If a
new drug were as effective at saving lives as Peter Pronovost's checklist, there would be a
nationwide marketing campaign urging doctors to use it.") (italics in original); Keith
Mattheessen, Cutting Doctors' Hours May Not Reduce Medical Errors, Studies Find, INS. J.,
Sept. 6, 2007, available at
www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2007/09/06/83233.htm; George J. Annas, The
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because of the undue pressure to see many patients as fast as possible in a
typical business day in order to obtain sufficient revenues to earn desired
income. 95
patient's right to safety, TRIAL, Oct. 2006, 38 (Hospitals have been slow to adopt measures
that would prevent medical errors that injure patients.").
However, the rancor occasioned by this issue and the degree it has driven a wedge
between doctors, lawyers, and policymakers to the benefit of insurers undoubtedly helps to
explain some of the dysfunctional policymaking in the area. See, e.g., Joe Mullin, Nevada's
Med-Mal Changes Help Doctors, Hinder Lawsuits, INS. J., Feb. 9, 2007, available at
www.insurancejoumal.com/news/west/2007/02/09/76860.htm; Tress Balda, Physician 'I'm
sorry' bills continues to spread, Nine more states debate laws banning apology from use in
litigation, NAT'L L.J., April 30, 2007; Joelle Babula, Medical Malpractice Insurance Crisis:
Lawyers slam doctors with ad, LAS VEGAS REv. J., July 16, 2002.
95. See JEROME GROOPMAN, How DOCTORS THINK 97 (2007) (describing financial
and insurance incentives pushing physicians in direction of spending inadequate time with
patients learning of their symptoms and case history); Uwe E. Reinhardt, Economists'
Model, supra note 3; Peter Salgo, The Doctor Will See You for Exactly Seven Minutes, Peter
Salgo, The Doctor Will See You for Exactly Seven Minutes, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2006.
According to Salgo, a professor at Columbia University's College of Physicians
and Surgeons, the new assembly line approach to seeing patients is closely linked to
pressure from insurers, business consultants, and particularly HMOs, to which he attributes
the formal requirements that doctors have no more than a seven-minute "encounter" with
patients rather than a more flexible, open-ended interview that is likely to reveal more about
the patient's condition.
This apparently kept shareholders happy. But it reduced the
doctor-patient relationship to a financial concept in a business school
term paper.
Doctors know you cannot provide compassion in seven-minute
aliquots. But we have felt powerless to change things. The medical
establishment has, many of us feel, simply rolled over and gone along to
get along. It has sacrificed patients' best interests on the altar of
financial return.
See Salgo, supra. Accord, Reinhardt, Economist's Model, supra note 3, at 463
("group medical practices may tie the distribution of income to their members closely to
each physician's 'productivity' and then unabashedly define productivity in terms of neither
clinical outcomes nor patients' satisfaction, but strictly in terms of the gross revenue the
physician brought into the clinic.") (footnote omitted); Carl Elliott, The Drug Pushers,
ATLANTIC MONTHLY, April 2006, 82 ("As American turns its health-care system over to the
market, pharmaceutical reps are wielding more and more influence - and the line between
them and doctors is beginning to blur)(italics in original); Vanessa Fuhrmans, Doctors
Assail UnitedHealth 's Threat of Fines: Sanctions would be imposed on physicians sending
patients to out-of-network labs for tests, WALL ST. J., April 10, 2007; Theresa Agovino,
Doctors Suspect Insurers' Rankings Measure Cost, Not Quality, INS. J., Feb. 9, 2007,
available at www.insurancejoumal.com/news/national/2007/02/09/76830.htm; David
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According to one widely taught business model, a physician who sees
patients as part of her practice (as contrasted to a medical group providing
only procedures) should spend no more than seven minutes with each
patient. As Jerome Groopman has powerfully demonstrated, truncated time
with patients contributes significantly to diagnostic error, especially if the
patient's problems are atypical or complex. Without taking sufficient time
to learn about the patient's malady, the doctor has an insufficient data base
for applying her exercise of professional judgment, even if one assumes
that some subset of seven minutes gives the doctor sufficient time to reflect
adequately and reach a considered personal opinion.96
Armstrong, Critical Dose: Aspirin Dispute Is Fueled by Funds of Industrial Rivals; A Cheap
Remedy for Clotting Used by Millions of Patients is Undermined by Research; Bayer's
Friends Fight Back WALL ST. J., April 24, 2006. But see Vanessa Fuhrmans, Insurers Stop
Paying For Care Linked to Errors, WALL ST. J., Jan. 15, 2008; Vanessa Fuhrmans, An
Insurer Tries A New Strategy: Listen to Patients, WALL ST. J., April 11, 2006.
However, to some extent, Salgo's proposed realistic solution to the problem of
assembly line medicine involves a reasonable dose of the consumer-driven, market
competition efficiency championed by Hyman. See id. ("solution to the problem" is "in the
hands of our patients" who should "adopt a business mind-set when shopping for health
care" and refuse to patronize brusque, patient-unfriendly physicians).
The problem, of course, is that it is increasingly hard to find these types of Marcus
Welby-style doctors with room to take on additional patients. The seven-minute, assembly
line doctor increasingly dominates the provider landscape and will continue to do so until
the medical insurance and payment system provides better incentives for better quality care,
including spending adequate time with patients.
This sort of medical consumerism is perfectly consistent with my preferences as
outlined in this article. What separates Hyman and me to a large degree is that Hyman
seems to me to convey the impression that insured patients are morally hazardous louts who
over-consume medical care without acting as a check on cost or quality while I contend that
natural patient desires for good care and experiences with the physician will allow some
consumer policing of medicine - if the patients have the ability to pay. Without it, patients
either skip care altogether, go to the cheapest doctor or the one with the most lenient
collection agency, or rely on inefficient emergency room care for what should be office
visits. See Bobinski, supra note 13, noting that Canadians on whole are much more likely to
get concededly necessary medical care than Americans); Edit., Emergency Room Delays,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2008 (attributing much of delay to demands placed by uninsured
patients).
96. See GROOPMAN, supra note 95, at 268. The problem is hardly confined to private
insurance providers. See, e.g., Alex Berenson, Cancer Drug Representatives Spelled Out
the Way to Profit, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 2007; Dan Stockman, State service's Medicaid bills
squeeze doctors, FT. WAYNE JOUR.-GAZETTE, Sept. 10, 2006 (describing doctor's receipt of
$260,000 bill from government because "his pool of Medicaid patients costs too much
money"). In the "haste makes waste" department, see also Shirley S. Wang, Institute Cites
Medication Errors, Suggests Changes to Cut Injuries, WALL ST. J., July 21, 2006.
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The cost-reduction programs for actual delivery of medical care and the
higher office overhead (it takes more office staff to process required
paperwork and haggle with insurers) prompted by insurers pushes against
traditional professional excellent and tends to undermine the quality of
medical care. In a sense, the insurance industry and government programs
like Medicare, Medicaid, and the VA are no different. The question then
becomes which type of entity will provide a better brand of coverage and
medical care regulation when measured along the multiple dimensions of
quality of care, amount of care, and cost.
Assessment of the quality-of-care dimension strongly suggests that
private insurers, driven by profit motive as well as legitimate cost concerns,
has to a large degree made medicine less of a profession and more of an
assembly-line style business. The product dispensed is health care, but the
mass produced health care of a medical Wal-Mart more than Marcus
Welby.
On one level, this may be a positive development for a large category
of consumers with routine medical problems that require only basic
solutions. The Marcus Welby method (which included house calls) made
for heart-warming (if occasionally corny) television but it wasn't very
efficient. Some cost-benefit sharpening of service delivery under the
traditional model is a positive development. On another level, however,
the assembly line commodification and economy of scale in much current
medical practice is undesirable in that it weakens the accuracy and depth of
diagnosis. It can have particularly serious adverse consequences where
medical problems are less typical or readily apparent and require greater
professional involvement by the doctor.
Even for not particularly esoteric patient problems, the quality of
medical care in this brave new world of medicine-as-a-business seems
suspect. As recounted above in my simple brush with infection, IV
antibiotics, and cyst drainage, the economic pressure placed on the medical
care system by the current medical coverage system appears to produce
suboptimal results, even if one credits the system with some significant
restraint on costs. In my relatively unremarkable case, the supposedly
wonderful system of private sector medical care and insurance produced
primary physicians who don't go to hospitals or otherwise follow through
with patient care and disengaged, ill-informed, hospitalists who provided
no continuity of care but who appeared to be protecting the economic self-
interest of hospitals at the expense of the patient. It also produced long
waits and needlessly protracted hospitalization; excessive testing to
"chum" my medical insurance portfolio to the benefit of hospitals and
[Vol. 14:2
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providers; and exorbitant requests for compensation by doctors with limited
diagnostic skill as well as inadequate motivation.97
In general, much of modem medical care appears organized around the
needs of insurers and medical providers rather than the patient. In addition
to long waits, there are the "banker's hours" of many physicians and
practices as well as poor response to patients unfortunate enough to be
stricken on evenings and weekends. Outside of the walls of a hospital,
medical service providers appear fragmented and scattered almost as if
intentionally attempting to test the patience of patients. In few medical
practices can the patient be seen by the doctor and take common required
lab tests that are part of shared medical records. The economics of the
current system militate against it. As a result, patients requiring relatively
simple things such as blood work, urine samples, x-rays, a CT scan, an
MRI, or more intrusive scoping, can almost never get this done under the
same roof (and certainly not on the same day or even a reasonably
compressed time frame.
The net result is to require patients, most of who must miss work for
medical care, to spent substantial hours crisscrossing metropolitan (or
worse yet, larger rural) areas for hours or days on end in order to get a basic
diagnosis, which then requires the patient to again relocate and queue in
line for any procedures required to attack a medical problem.98 Add to this
substantial repetitive paperwork and at least some jousting with medical
insurers, all against a backdrop of legitimate quality concerns, and there is
more than a little worth criticizing in the status quo.99
97. See supra notes 84-88.
98. See Hyman & Silver, supra note 61, at 959 (labeling situation "deplorable"). See
also REGINA E. HERZLINGER, MARKET-DRIVEN HEALTH CARE: WHO WINS, WHO LOSES IN
THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICA'S LARGEST SERVICE INDUSTRY 20-33, 250-51 (1997).
The inconvenience of obtaining care of course pales in comparison to the problems and lost
productivity that occurs when people are uninsured or lack adequate coverage. See
generally Melissa B. Jacoby, The Debtor-Patient Revisited, 51 ST. Louis L.J. 307 (2007)
(collecting data regarding lost productivity and value resulting from illness, injury, and
medical treatment).
99. There also appears generally to be inadequate regulation of physicians. It appears,
for example, that a disturbingly large number of doctors relocate their practices to new
states simply to stay a step ahead of regulators in their former state of licensing. Some
doctors are essentially on the lam from one state to another because of past problems in the
prior state. For years, state medical boards have embarrassed themselves by failing to stop
this sort of opportunistic pulling up of stakes and failed to required adequate disclosure of a
doctor's past problems. In one relatively recent and notorious case, a doctor with a
checkered past who had relocated to Colorado committed egregious malpractice and
seriously injured a boy. In outraged response, the state legislature enacted a law requiring
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The economics of the current system appears to have undermined or
even imperiled professionalism by encouraging an assembly-line like
commodification of medicine and medical procedures. For receipt of
diagnostic testing, lab work, and corrective procedures, including surgery,
the problems appear primarily to be the inefficiency of delay and questions
of competence by the service providers (who may puncture an organ,
amputate the wrong appendage, etc.). For delivery of physician
consultation, the effect is arguably more pernicious in that it robs
diagnosticians of a precious tool - information - because primary care
physicians, internists and other specialists often are unwilling or unable to
listen effectively long enough due to the pressure of their business models
and income goals.' 00
Ironically, the financial pressure on doctors and their perceived need to
ramp up the quantity of care delivered to make up for reduced insurer
payments was arguably supported by the inventor of the invisible hand.
Smith wanted professionals to be adequately paid and to have decent
working conditions that would permit the professional to acquire necessary
skill and breathing space for good judgment focused on the instant patient
or client. He saw this as a necessary price to pay to obtain adequate
professional services.10 1 But misapplication of Smith's primary faith in
markets, coupled with the perhaps pathological ways in which the U.S. has
deviated from a market model without replacing it with a comprehensive
government model, has produced a status quo Smith would have abhorred:
medical professionals who so scurry to earn what they consider an adequate
income that they devote insufficient time to many patients, thereby
truncating the information they receive, rushing to judgment that is often
erroneous. As a result, diagnostic error is much higher than it should be.
The correct diagnosis may not come until the patient has endured
considerable pain and inconvenience at substantial cost and, in some cases,
may not come at all or only after the patient's demise.
disclosure of such past events to prospective and current patients. Good doctors should
embrace this type of regulation because it would be both good marketing and diminish the
business of problematic doctors. It appears that only 17 percent of physicians ever are sued
for malpractice and that a relatively small group of doctors create the bulk medical
malpractice claims. As the saying goes, five percent of the people create 90 percent of the
problems But if the regulatory system does not adequately intervene, these five percent can
wreak havoc for years or even decades.
100. See GROOPMAN, supra note 95, at 226-231.
101. See SMITH, Wealth of Nations, supra note 6, at I11.
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Alternatively, it would seem much better to operate a system that was
not so dependent on squeezing doctor income that it produced adverse
collateral impact. One would expect a rational health care system to make
it sufficiently attractive for a high quality treating physician to be
sufficiently compensated for each interaction with a patient to spend
adequate time with the patient.
IV. THE LIMITS OF CONSUMERISM AS A HEALTH CARE
POLICY AND THE INEXORABLE CASE FOR
COMPREHENSIVE PUBLIC MEDICAL INSURANCE
By now, it is obvious that more of my sympathies lie with the social
justice and professionalism paradigms more than market and consumer
choice models. Consequently, my sympathies lie more with Jost and
Mariner, even though I am concerned that even their informative writings
use what I have come to regard as the subtle but misleading nomenclature
of personal responsibility and actuarial fairness. Notwithstanding these
quibbles, Jost's piece persuasively highlights a major problem with HSAs
and the larger consumer-driven movement. Even if it works for many, the
primary beneficiaries are the largely healthy and wealthy, who hardly need
the tax subsidy/shelter provided by HSAs. Beyond this, the consumer-
driven health movement works against the communitarian norm and makes
a universally effective medical coverage program harder to obtain.
Mariner, in addition, to also noting the limitations of the consumer-driven
health care initiative, presents the important insight that even something as
seemingly uncontroversial as "wellness" programs can contribute to the
undesirable erosion of community solidarity and social justice in medical
care and coverage.
Hyman, although as usual raising many excellent points regarding the
operation of government programs, remains too enamored of the market as
a cure-all. This is too unrealistically sanguine a view, even for a Smithite,
in light of the muddled, path-dependent history of American health policy.
Establishment of true market hegemony is both practically feasible and
undesirable in light of the core necessity of medical care, even for the
comparatively impoverished, unwise, and irresponsible. Playing John
Wayne to the more Martin Luther King-like postures of Jost and Mariner,
Hyman also continues to give short shrift to the professionalism wing of
Adam Smith's writing in that Hyman, although deferring to medical
expertise over consumer preference on some matters (e.g., drive-by
deliveries), often paints a picture of medical providers as greedy
opportunists who would have been at home in the Enron boardroom. My
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own view toward providers, particularly physicians, is more charitable,
although Hyman's warnings in this regard cannot be totally ignored.
0 2
Ultimately, however, Hyman fails to persuade because his proposed
solution to health care issues favors an impractical return to the pre-World
War II yesteryear of the allegedly pure market-based medical care that
supposedly once existed, accompanied by a presumed shrewd consumer
participation in the market which will, according to Hyman, lower medical
costs and enable patients to receive affordable medical care most pertinent
to their needs. One might as readily believe that the tooth fairy will be
coming to everyone's neighborhood soon.
First, it is too late to turn back the clock. Better to look forward rather
than back and move from oligarchic medical insurance to true universal
government-funded care. 0 3  Second, Hyman presumes an infallibly
102. Nor can it be ignored that much of Hyman's scholarship urges increased quality-
enhancement efforts directed toward improving the performance of medical professionals.
See, e.g., Hyman & Silver, supra note 61 at 958-59. In this quest, he sees a more effective
role for consumer than I think is realistic while I support more stringent government efforts
in this regard that will not be diluted by the economic incentives of private medical insurers.
103. This increasingly seems to be the position of many commentators. See, e.g.,
KRUGMAN, supra note 18, at 237-43 (proposing that Medicare be expanded to cover entire
population); Peter D. Jacobson & Rebecca L. Braun, Let 1000 Flowers Wilt: The Futility of
State-Level Health Care Reform, 55 KAN. L. REv. 1173 (2007); Maxwell J. MehIman,
"Medicover": A Proposal for National Health Insurance, 17 HEALTH MATRIX 1 (2007)
(essentially suggesting expansion of Medicare, "[tihe most efficient administrative system
for health insurance" based on October 2006 conference of health law experts); Artur Davis,
The Health Care We Owe Each Other: Universal Care as the 21st Century Social Compact,
37 CUMB. L. REv. 425 (2006); John A. Nyman, The Efficiency of Equity, 37 CUMB. L. REv.
461 (2006); David U. Himmelstein & Steffie Woolhandler, A National Health Program for
the United States: A Physician's Proposal, 320 NEw ENG. J. MED. 102 (1989) (proposing
comprehensive national health care system); Annette Fuentes, Wat's wrong with
nationalized health care?, USA TODAY, Sept. 19, 2007, available at
http://blogs.usatoday.com/oped/2007/09/what-wrong-wit.html (supporting single-payer
system); Milt Freudenheim, Mayo Clinic Proposing A Universal Health Plan, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 15, 2007, C4, col. 4 ("But Mayo, in a proposal hammered out over 18 months by a
panel of more than 400 health policy experts, is not advocating a government-run single-
payer system. Instead, it suggested that private insurance companies be required to offer
standard plans with many options, like the Federal Employees Health Benefit Plan available
to government workers. Applicants for this insurance could not be turned down ... Lower-
income people would get government help on a sliding scale." Ironically, Mayo Clinic co-
founder Charles Mayo, then president of the AMA, had during the early 20th Century
warned doctors to be wary of universal health insurance out of fear it would not only reduce
physician incomes but undermine professional judgment and the doctor-patient relationship.
See Cynthia Crossen, Before WWI Began, Universal Health Care Seemed a Sure Thing,
WALL ST. J., April 30, 2007); Robert H. Frank, A Health Care Plan So Simple, Even Stephen
Colbert Couldn't Simplify It, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2007, C3, col. 1 (noting that "American
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shrewd, disciplined consumer that never was and never will be, at least
where medical and insurance purchases are concerned. °4  Third, as
discussed above, Hyman's perspective, however wonderful it may sound in
theory, fails to square with the practical realities of consumer ignorance,
bounded rationality, heuristic error, reduced choice, lack of time for
investigation, and general lack of meaningful ability to comparison shop
for medical insurance coverage. In addition to the practical limitations on
lay patients, the dominance of group medical plans alone dramatically
distorts whatever chance might otherwise exist to tame medical costs and
excessive use of services through empowered consumerism.
Realistic assessment of the lay citizenry should appreciate that people
are on average normally not sufficiently rational, informed, or disciplined
to be able make the type of consistently intelligent medical treatment
decisions upon which the consumer-driven model depends if it is to be
anything other than a government-subsidized tax break for the rich.
Perhaps more important, nearly half of medical care already is subject to
government funding and substantial regulation. A move toward a more
market based, consumer-driven system would at best produce a hybrid that
continues the inefficiencies of the status quo without much countervailing
efficiency advantage and a redistributive trend toward the already well-off.
All this leads me to the inexorable conclusion that the optimal practical
means to serve both community solidarity and true consumer choice is to
expand Medicare and make it the mandatory medical insurance coverage
for all Americans. This will, according to Hyman, bring cackles of delight
in Hades as another American jumps on his posited road to hell paved with
costs are so high in part because the reliance on private insurance multiplies administrative
expenses, currently about 31 percent of total outlays ... Most health economists agree that
government-financed reimbursement is the only practical way to control these expenses,
many of them stemming from insurers' efforts to identify and avoid unhealthy people.
Canada's single-payer health system, which covers everyone, spends less than 17 percent on
administrative expenses... A move to a single-payer plan would save more than enough to
compensate insurance companies for lost profits."); Bannister, November is Coming, supra
note 1, at 27 (proposing a "[n]ew nonprofit insurance company ... [that] would provide
basic health coverage for all. The nonprofit company might be run by elected citizens that
would use open hearings to design plans and set premiums. One important safeguard against
fiscal irresponsibility would be to prohibit the nonprofit from issuing long-term debt.")
104. Hyman's infallibly shrewd consumer must also be independently wealthy, retired,
or otherwise have considerable time on his or her hands. Even if consumers possessed the
tools to function in the market.Nirvana posited by Hyman and scholars of similar bent, they
would need more time for researching, making, assessing, and recalibrating their medical
and insurance purchases than one can realistically assume is possessed by normal working
people.
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good intentions'0 5 by giving even more power to the Medicare juggernaut.
I disagree, in part for reasons stemming from Hyman's own critique of
Medicare, which he describes as a "Ponzi" scheme dependent on the
attraction of new participants (a/k/a "marks" in Hyman's view) to finance
the benefits of those who entered the Ponzi period at an earlier juncture.
Hyman is correct to point out that Medicare in its current form is too
dependent on the young and healthy subsidizing older persons more
demanding of (and in need of) medical care. As his devilish alter ego put
it:
As you [Mephistopheles] correctly perceived many
years ago, allowing everyone into Medicare would
immediately bankrupt the program because the cross-
subsidies that sustain Medicare are only achievable if there
are sufficient marks outside the program to pay the
necessary funds into the program. Program beneficiaries
understand this point perfectly well. The demise of the
[proposed 1993] Clinton plan was inevitable once it
became clear that the plan would "take" from the elderly
and "give" to the uninsured. We are far better off delaying
the day of reckoning by a few years and allowing the
gluttony of Medicare beneficiaries and the passage of time
to increase the number of unsustainable commitments .
106
This portion of Hyman's critique resonates, but does so in favor of
making the move toward expanded Medicare sooner rather than later. To
be sure, moving from a system designed to protect the elderly, and which
as to some extent becomes afflicted with excessive interest group
politics,0 7 to one covering a larger, more diverse population with differing
105. Although considerably less extreme, Hyman in a sense is an intellectual heir of
Friedrich Hayek, a libertarian who embraced individualism so strongly that he and his
followers not only inveighed against the very real evils of communism and other forms of
totalitarianism but also opposed even the sort of "soft socialism" that can provide the
infrastructure necessary for civilized progress. See, e.g., FRIEDRICH HAYEK, THE ROAD TO
SERFDOM (1944). This also arguably makes Hyman heir to the considerably less intellectual
John Wayne legacy.
106. See Hyman, Mephistopheles, supra note 63, 60 WASH. & LEE L. REv. at 1185-86
(emphasis in original; footnotes omitted).
107. As Hyman correctly points out, the adverse reaction of so-called "greedy
geezers" (my and the media's term, not Hyman's) to the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage
Act of 1988, which merely required Medicare beneficiaries to pay some of the cost of
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incidence of medical needs will require some recalibration of benefits
offered, prices paid, and funds collected (through tax, premiums, co-pays,
and deductibles). But the experience of other nations strongly suggests that
this can be effectively done in a manner that will eventually result in
overall improvement of care at lower cost.
"[C]ritics of the single-payer plan have long railed against the specter
of socialized medicine, suggesting that it means being treated by
government functionaries" the "people who have experienced single-payer
coverage firsthand seem unconcerned."'10 8 As Cornell economist Robert
Frank relates: "When one of my sons needed surgery for a broken arm
during a sabbatical in Paris, for example, the medical system we
encountered was just as professional as the American one and far less
bureaucratic."' 0 9 My own experience with my son's attack of bronchitis in
Germany was similar. Seeing a doctor and filling the required prescription
was faster, easier, and cheaper than had the same adverse medical event
occurred in the United States - and my son was of course not even part of
the German citizenry for whose benefit the plan was designed."0 At some
expanded coverage, and the political cowardice of Congress in repealing the act in the face
of these tantrums, illustrates a problem with having government in the insurance business.
See supra note 62. But there is no iron law that Medicare must be under-funded or poorly
administered. More to the point: the occasional electoral pathologies of Mediare seem to
me no worse than the chronic problems besetting system using private insurance. See, e.g.,
supra notes 4, 13, 18, supra (discussing high relative cost of U.S. medical care system);
Mary Crossley, Discrimination Against the Unhealthy in Health Insurance, 54 KAN. L. REV.
73, 152 (2005) ("[P]eople with health problems increasingly are forced to shoulder the load
of their own medical costs. The trend toward consumerism in health coverage shifts not
simply costs, but also insurance risk, to individual insureds, and the results may be
particularly dire for people in poor health."); Nan D. Hunter, Managed Process, Due Care:
Structures of Accountability in Health Care, 6 YALE J. HEALTH, POL'Y, L. & ETHICs 93, 145
(2006) (discussing problems associated with current system's private adjudicative
mechanisms for determination of necessity of care); George A. Nation III, Obscene
Contracts: The Doctrine of Unconscionability and Hospital Billing of the Uninsured, 94
Ky. L.J. 101, 112 (2005) (noting degree to which current system warps pricing, resulting in
posted retail price inflicted upon uninsured as contrasted to discounted price charged to
insured patients).
108. See Frank, supra note 103, at C3, col. 1.
109. Id. at col. 5 "And [as Frank emphasizes for the slow to grasp] in France, which
spends half as much on health care as the United States and has more doctors and hospital
beds per capita, everyone is covered." Id.
110. I realize that Germany has a system someone different than the arguably "purer"
government single payer systems of France and Canada in that private insurance plays more
of a role in Germany. But for purposes of this comment, I do not believe it unfair to lump
Germany with what I call "single-payer" countries (because of national government
commitment to and administration of medical insurance), to whom they are far closer
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point, all the ideology and theorizing in the world must yield to the hard
empirical facts suggesting that medical care in Western Europe and Canada
appears to be both cheaper and superior on the whole that that of the United
States.''
Rather than attempting to demonize (in Hyman's case, quite literally)
government insurance plans as spendthrift bureaucracies, we would be
better off appreciating them as aspects of national infrastructure akin to
roads, police and fire protection, and national defense.,l 2 A comprehensive
medical care program for all (which realistically can only be achieved
through the government-run, single-payer approach), like these other
regarding health care policy. See Jost, Is Health Insurance a Bad Idea? The Consumer-
Driven Persepctive, 14.2 CON. INS. L.J. 377 (2008); RICHARD KNOx, GERMANY'S HEALTH
SYSTEM, ONE NATION, UNITED WITH HEALTH CARE FOR ALL (Faulkner and Gray 1993).
Regarding non-U.S. health care systems, see generally ANTONIA MAIONI, PARTING AT THE
CROSSROADS: THE EMERGENCE OF HEALTH INSURANCE IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA
(Princeton University Press 1998); ); CHRIS HAM (ED.), HEALTH CARE REFORM: LEARNING
FROM INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE (Opem University Press 1997) (discussing UK, Sweden,
Netherlands and Germany as well as U.S.); FRANCIS D. POWELL & ALBERT F. WESSEN
(EDS.), HEALTH CARE SYSTEMS IN TRANSITION: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE (1993)
(providing a general overview with particular focus on German, Candadian, Swedish and
British systems). But see William P. Gunnar, The Fundamental Law That Shapes the
United States Health Care System: Is Universal Health Care Realistic Within the
Established Paradigm, 15 ANNALS OF HEALTH L. 151, 156 (2006) (concluding that the
answer is "no").
111. See supra notes 4, 13, 18, supra; Jacobi, supra note 4, at 535-36; Manfred Huber
& Eva Orosz, Health Expenditures Trends in OECD Countries, 1990-2001, 25 HEALTH
CARE FIN. REV. 1 (2003).
112. Of course, the current American government treatment of these infrastructure
issues is not particularly encouraging. See Free Hiatt, She Brakes for Ideology, WASH.
POST, Jan. 23, 2008, A15, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2008/01/20/AR2008012002275.html ("[T]raffic congestion already is
costing the U.S. economy as much as $200 billion a year.").
My primary point, however, is that there is no doubt that inadequate infrastructure
imposes costs on society. We do not enjoy net savings simply because we spend less (and
do less) regarding roads, bridges, policemen, fireman, soldiers - or health insurance.
Further, many of the current government's failures concerning the transportation
infrastructure stem not from institutional incompetence but from ideology-based resistance
that recently has trumped sound policy analysis. See Hiatt, supra ([According to the Bush
Administration, the "main reason you are sitting in traffic... is not that the purchasing
power of Highway Trust Fund revenue has been dwindling for the past decade, not that
population and freight traffic have been soaring with no government response - but that you
are not being asked to pay enough to use ihe road you are on.") Hiatt also notes that the
Bush Administration rejected a bipartisan federal commission's "comprehensive, balanced
plan for the next 50 years, calling for maintenance and construction, road and rail, public
and private roads." Id. (emphasis in original).
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infrastructure programs, provides a platform for greater national
productivity 113 as well as social justice and a chance for medical
professionals to practice their craft under a set of incentives more
supportive of quality care.' 14  Only some small increment of faux
individualism is lost. 15
American attitudes toward health care and medical insurance continue
to be unduly dominated by accidents of history and the mythological power
of the nation's archetypes. The rugged individualism embodied in John
Wayne, and the market efficiency associated with Adam Smith are today's
dominant archetypes. Although each embodies characteristics that are
desirable in general (who can, as a general proposition, be against
individualism, personal responsibility, ambition, free markets and greater
113. See, e.g., Jennifer Robison, Staffs May Shrink: Plurality of companies say they'll
thin ranks as costs for health insurance rise, LAS VEGAS REv.-J., Jan. 21, 2008, available at
http://www.lvrj.com/business/13942712.html. For example, employers freed of the burden
of being the nation's front line source of medical coverage would also be freed of the need
to make personnel and payment decisions based on consideration of the cost of group
medical care.
114. See Furrow, supra note 14, at 417 ("[Tlhe moral argument of social solidarity
with our fellows, so eloquently put by Timothy Jost in his comparative work on European
systems, pulls in tandem with the conservative argument that more health care is better for
the economy.") (citing TIMOTHY S. JOST, DISENTITLEMENT?: THE THREATS FACING OUR
PUBLIC HEALTH-CARE PROGRAMS AND A RIGHTS-BASED RESPONSE (Oxford University Press
2003)).
115. In Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith made a similar defense of public works
spending as a useful investment to assist the market economy in reaching its full potential.
See SMITH, supra note 6, at 473-85. Thus, there was an "infrastructure" Smith as well as a
professionalism Smith and a market Smith. Although the pro-market, "invisible hand"
Smith is most prominent in his writing, the American adaptation of Smith has tended to
completely ignore Smith's support of professionalism and infrastructure.
Some see this and the overwhelming American aversion to self-consciously
adopting a government single-payer system as a product of interest group conspiracy. See,
e.g., MICHAEL TOWNES WATSON, AMERICA'S TUNNEL VISION: How INSURANCE COMPANIES'
PROPAGANDA IS CORRUPTING MEDICINE & LAW 276 (Horatio Press 2006). Although the
lobbying and public relations campaigns of insurers, drug companies, medical providers,
and other interest groups have undoubtedly all contributed to fostering the "market-uber-
alles" ethos of the U.S., my own view is that it is largely the organic product of the
historical evolution of American self-identity.
America celebrates markets, personal wealth, and rugged individualism like no
other country in the world. By contrast, Canadian culture gives proportionately greater
celebration to collective national enterprise, such as the building of the Trans-Canadian
railroad. In Canada, the thousands of workers get credit. In the U.S., the CEO of the
railroad company would likely be the hero of the story. This difference in national psyche
goes a long way toward explaining the different national systems of medical care and
insurance.
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economic wealth?), slavish, blind, and inflexible devotion to these
idealized concepts has produced an unwillingness to face basic operational
and empirical facts about the optimal means for maximizing access to
health care and medical coverage for the citizenry.16
Without doubt, a government-administered public insurance plan is the
optimal route. Whatever theoretical uncertainty may exist in thought
experiments or political debate is belied by the empirical evidence.
Canada, Great Britain, France, Italy, Scandinavia and Germany all spent
about half as much per capita on health care as the U.S. and have healthier,
longer-lived populations. Of these countries, only Germany has anything
looking in any way similar to the public-private partnerships urged by the
most liberal of American politicians. The others are all government-run
single payer systems of medical insurance. England actually runs the
medical side as well as the insurance side and has what might accurately be
termed socialized medicine in which the doctors work for the government.
Most important, Medicare has operated successfully as a single-payer form
of public insurance for 40 years. Its imperfections can be improved upon
and its reach extended.
116. See Stone, supra note 53, at 486-87. Deborah Stone's assessment of the excesses
of this ethos is even more condemning:
The consumer choice approach to social policy represents a
cynical turn in American public philosophy.. . . More often than not,
"consumer choice" and "consumer direction" are glittery wrappings in
which employers, insurers, and politicians package benefit reductions,
program contractions, and budget cuts.
Giving people a budget that is too small for their needs does
not give them the experience of freedom. Instead, they experience
every decision not as free choice but as a terrible trade-off.
Consumer choice theory is thus an ideology. It is a way of
seeing the world, and particularly a way of interpreting social justice. It
is a philosophy that minimizes communal obligations to citizens,
maximizes individually responsibility for one's own well-being, and
tolerates great inequalities in well-being as morally acceptable. It
replaces a social commitment to meeting needs with commitment to
meeting budgets. It uses the rhetoric of "freedom" and "autonomy" to
justify the abdication of social responsibility and the failure to provide
appropriate and compassionate care.
See Stone, False Promise, supra note 53, at 486-87. See also Stone, Beyond Moral
Hazard, supra note 48.
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The actual operation of health care and insurance in the real world
demonstrates that the single payer system and close equivalents are simply
more efficacious than the American status quo and so-called "consumer-
driven" alternatives. It no longer makes sense to shy away from this
approach simply because of the aura associated with Wayne and the market
side of Smith's persona. After too long a period of the dominance of these
images, the time has come to reassert the professionalism side of Smith
and, more important, the social justice and community solidarity values
embodied in Martin Luther King's legacy.
CONCLUSION
To be sure, a government can administer a medical coverage system
badly. But it is equally true that a government-run system can be efficient,
probably at least as efficient as the current insurer-dominated, employer-
dominated system. Greater progress will be made when policymakers
focus on the factors that make for effective government operation of
insurance coverage and free themselves from the tyranny of legal fictions
and mythology about the infallibility of markets, personal fault, consumer
omniscience, medical provider behavior, and private insurer efficacy.
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